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The growing and persistent nature of today’s protracted refugee situations pose 
significant threats to the host countries and regions that support these vulnerable people.  
While stateless, refugees fall under the protection of the international community and its 
laws.  However, it is the effects of state policy that actually shape the living conditions 
and the opportunities available for refugees, and in turn influence the security 
repercussions they can set in motion. 
This thesis examines the relationship between the tendency of state policies 
regarding Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria to create isolation or 
integration, and the relative extent of national and regional security issues and concerns 
surrounding refugees within their respective territories.  From these relationships, this 
study will determine that national policies that effectively contribute to integrating 
refugees into the host society, as opposed to isolating them, will greatly reduce the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The increasing number of refugees throughout the world has given rise to new 
international risks and security issues, ranging from drug smuggling to guerilla warfare.  
These issues are of global interest and cannot be ignored, because they influence both the 
safety of refugees and the stability of the regions in which they exist.  The international 
community, realizing such threats, has established a number of treaties relating to the 
rights and responsibilities of refugees.  Each country, however, is left to determine who 
qualifies as a refugee and how each person will be treated, housed and assisted while he 
or she remains in the host nation.  This thesis will attempt to answer how variations in 
these national policies create or affect international security issues by dictating the living 
conditions, work opportunities, and subsidies allowed for refugees and by creating 
cultural assimilation or isolation.  Also, this study will attempt to determine whether or 
not certain policies increase security risks and issues, while others decrease the potential 
negative effects of refugees on security within a host country.  I will use a review of 
existing literature on Lebanon, Syria and Egypt to determine what policies they have 
employed towards refugees and to identify what security consequences these policies 
created. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
According to the United Nations High Commissioner 1951 Convention on the 
Status of Refugee, anyone is considered a refugee who:  
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it,”1  
Since the beginning of the twentieth century the international community has recognized 
that refugees are a persistent situation and that the number of such people will continue to 
                                                 
1“Convention and Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations High Commissioner 
on Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/basics.html (accessed February 5, 2008). 
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increase so long as war and persecution exist.  International laws have been created with 
the intention to protect the refugee.  However, the leeway for individual interpretation 
and implementation at the state level through national policy creates a broad spectrum of 
living conditions across various host nations.  By looking at the security policies in 
several different sets of conditions, a possible relationship may be identified between the 
types of policies used to administer refugees and the problems attributed to the presence 
of refugees. 
A study of how state policy may contribute to refugee security issues will not 
provide a solution for the overall situation, but it will aid in limiting the obstructions that 
complicate the search for an answer.  Policy perspectives relating to refugees generally 
focus on international positions dealing with the conflict or humanitarian crisis in the 
originating country.  Instead of focusing on international policies and/or source countries, 
directing attention to differing refugee treatment policies may provide a source for 
limiting the security issues prompted by the presence of refugees. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
International laws exist to protect and care for refugees.  Differing interpretations 
and implementations at the state level through national policy create a continuum of 
living situations from near isolation on one end to almost complete integration on the 
other.  The widely varied stability and security conditions that surround refugees stem 
from the differing state policies as manifested in the living situations.  By looking at the 
varying situations in several host nations, the intent will be to identify the factors and 
policies which create the most secure situation for the refugees, the state and the region.  
Then an attempt will be made to show that state policies which lead toward integration 
will tend to decrease security issues related to refugees, whereas policies that produce 
isolation will be more likely to produce or increase security issues or problems.  
State policy is not the only influencing factor for refugee security issues, and 
isolating the effects of policy will be a problem to address.  In order to determine if a 
policy is relevant to security, the particular security issues that are associated with a 
group of refugees and their causes must be identified.   Then the policy of each case state 
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needs to be examined.  Next, the reaction of refugees to these policies must be 
determined, in order to identify if the policy has an integrating or isolating affect.  If 
refugee reactions to either integration or isolation are indicative of the reasons for 
security issues, a link may then be identified between policy and security.  How refugees 
act is dependent on state policies, and how they act affects the level of security issues 
surrounding them. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a wealth of literature regarding refugees.  As an enduring international 
situation, the initial questions of responsibility and protection for this vulnerable body of 
people have been widely addressed. The 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status 
of Refugees established contemporary refugee rights and responsibilities in the 
international community.  As with all treaties, there are numerous interpretations and 
evolving applications of the 1951 Convention and subsequent agreements.  In The Rights 
of Refugees under International Law, James C. Hathaway details the rights belonging to 
refugees as granted by international law in the 1951 UN Convention.2  The importance of 
such works is that they create an acceptable framework from which host states can create 
policies for handling refugees who approach and/or enter their countries.  However, some 
researchers such as Jens Vedsted-Hansen recognize that varying interpretations for the 
terms of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees are emerging in order to suit 
the increasing security concerns of current and potential protracted refugee situations.  
These new interpretations, in a growing number of instances, create a “gulf, between the 
reality of institutional and state action and the rights of refugees” allowing for 
inconsistent application of laws at the state level and the room to evaluate which policies 
are the most beneficial.3   
 
                                                 
2 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
3 Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey, Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International 
Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), abstract. 
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Another area of more recent research relating to refugees is that of security issues.  
There are a large number of concerns stemming from the displacement of people across 
international borders.  Sara Kenyon Lischer evaluates refugees as a cause and continued 
perpetuators of conflict.  In Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee camps, Civil War, and the 
Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Lischer discusses how the militarization of refugee 
camps, lack of protection and action by host states and the siphoning of international aid 
to rebels leads to increased violence both at home and across the region.4  Fiona 
Adamson, although grouping refugees among all migrants, also identifies cross border 
movement, changing cultural identity, Diasporas and humanitarian aid as contributing 
support for conflict in a refugee’s home nation.5   
The prevailing notion appears to be that the refugees create security issues, 
regardless of the situation in which they live within a host country.  Therefore, policies 
are generally seen as a response, rather than as prospective causes or influencing factors 
for security issues.  In “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to 
Mass Refugee Influxes” Karen Jacobson focuses on how international, local and refugee 
pressures affect whether a host government is acquiescent and responds according to the 
United Nation’s recommendations, or employs a differing practice.  Since these pressures 
change often, so does the country’s reply in the form of policies towards refugees.6  In 
The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon: The Politics of Refugee Integration Simon Haddad 
examines the Lebanese attitudes and subsequent policy towards Palestinians.  Haddad 
considers Palestinian treatment and the potential for integration and permanent residency 
in this host country as contingent on the economic and security issues anticipated by the 
                                                 
4 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
5 Fiona Adams, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” International 
Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.1adamson.pdf (accessed March 31, 2008). 
6 Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee 
Influxes,” International Migration Review 30, no. 3 (Autumn, 1996), 
http://www.jstor.org/page/termsConfirm.jsp?redirectUri=/stable/pdfplus/2547631.pdf (accessed March 31, 
2008). 
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Lebanese majority.7  In this situation policies are based on prejudices towards the 
refugees and not on molding a positive outcome considering both refugee rights and 
national security.   
There are also numerous conjectures on what actions or policies should be applied 
in order to improve the conditions and consequences of cross border displacement.  In 
Refugees into Citizens: Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Donna Arzt 
argues that citizenship is required for a secure and stable solution to the Palestinian 
refugee crisis.8  While in “Unsettling the Categories of Displacement” Julie Peteet 
discusses new trends in refugee management, including the use of containment spaces 
such as safe havens or “catch basins,” which essentially prevent refugees from crossing 
over international borders.  She also points to the lack of Iraqi refugee acknowledgement 
and assistance, along with the UNHCR’s preference for non-repatriation as indicative of 
the uncertain future for refugees.9   
In “Refugee Security and the Organizational logic of Legal Mandates” Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar examines the evolution of the United Nations High Commissioner on 
Refugees and the consequences of “bureaucratic dynamics, political pressures, and legal 
interpretations”10 on limiting the actions of the UNHCR and other agencies towards 
reducing refugee security concerns.  If it is the case that non-governmental agencies are 
often undercut in their attempts to help refugees, states should be in the position to best 
assist refugees through policies beneficial to the security of all.  While current policy 
seems to be only in response to current situations, it will be useful to examine what the 
outcomes of the existing policies are in order to identify what actions can be taken to 
drive towards more secure and just refugee situations.  
                                                 
7 Simon Haddad, The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon: The Politics of Refugee Integration (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2003). 
8 Donna E. Arzt, Refugees into Citizens: Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 2. 
9 Julie Peteet, “Unsettling the Categories of Displacement,” Middle East Report, 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer244/peteet.html (accessed March 15, 2008). 
10 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Refugee Security and the Organizational logic of Legal Mandates,” 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 37 (2006), 583, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID918320_code254274.pdf?abstractid=918320&mirid=5 
(accessed February 20, 2008). 
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D. OVERVIEW 
Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the region that encompasses 
Palestine/Israel has been disputed over by the Jews and the Palestinians.  Not until the 
1947 UN General Assembly resolution 181, which granted Palestinian Jews 
approximately 48% more land than they previously had under Jewish ownership, was a 
partition plan put into effect.11  News of this resolution brought additional violent clashes 
between elated Jews and angered Arab Palestinians.  Outright civil war exploded in 
Palestine as Jews, via direct expulsion or threat of violence and ethnic cleansing, drove 
approximately 805,000 Arab Palestinians out of both Jewish and Arab lands between 
1947 and 1949.12  Thus, “the great majority of the Palestinians who lived in the area 
given to or annexed by Israel became refugees during and following the 1948 war” and 
continued to flee throughout the violence of the next several decades.13 
This thesis will use a comparative study of the refugee policies of Lebanon, Egypt 
and Syria towards Palestinian refugees present in each respective country. The policies in 
effect will be identified and the resultant living conditions, work opportunities, and 
financial resources available for refugees will be examined.  Current state policies and 
refugee treatment will be derived from online refugee sources, the international 
agreements to which each country is party, and secondary academic sources.  Outcomes 
of the different initial policy variables will be studied to find similarities or difference 
that affect refugee behavior and potential security issues.  
In order to identify a possible relationship between state policy and refugee 
security issues, it is important to independently determine what the causes are of the 
particular security issues, and what are the reactions of refugees to policies.  Then, how 
refugee reactions affect security issues in a particular set of circumstance will be 
                                                 
11 PLO Department of Refugee Affairs, The Palestinian Refugees 1948-2000: Factfile (Ramallah: 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, 2000). 
12 Mazin B. Qumsiyeh. Sharing the Land of Canaan: Human Rights and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Struggle (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 35. 
13 Hassan Elnajjar, “Planned Emigration: the Palestinian Case,” International Migration Review 27, 
no. 1 (Spring, 1993), 35, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0197-
9183%28199321%2927%3A1%3C34%3APETPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T. (accessed February 29, 2008). 
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observed.  Through organizing this thesis by individual case studies, it will be possible to 
discern common responses and causes as indicative of how state policy can affect 
security issues.   
Following this introduction will be a discussion of security issues that surround 
the struggle of refugees to survive in a foreign country and some of the causes of these 
issues.  Next, a brief review of international laws regarding refugees will provide the 
international expectation of refugee protection.  This information provides a loose 
framework for state policy.  The bulk of this thesis will evaluate what the state policies 
towards refugees are in the countries of Lebanon, Egypt and Syria.  For each country the 
laws regarding living conditions, work opportunities, and financial resources will be 
delineated as contributing towards isolation or integration, and refugee responses will be 
determined.  The specific security issues associated with the refugees of each country will 
be identified.   
In the conclusion, through comparative analysis of how state policy and refugee 
responses affect security issues in Lebanon, Egypt and Syria a link between policy and 
security will be shown.  In locations, such as Syria, where national policy seeks to 
integrate refugees into its society fewer refugee-related security problems will arise.  
Conversely, when a state, such as Lebanon, uses its policies to isolate refugees from the 
host society an increase in state and region security problems will be seen.  Lastly, 
despite employing laws that tend toward isolation, the early use of policy in Egypt to 
drastically reduce the number or refugees within its borders, though not currently a 
legitimate practice, significantly limited the abilities of the refugees to respond in a 
threatening way. 
 8
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II. REFUGEE SECURITY 
This chapter will identify predominant security issues on both the domestic and 
the international levels that can exist due to the presence of refugees.  Migration and 
border crossing, particularly in the case of refugees, poses a number of critical security 
issues.  Once settled in a host country, the risks do not typically diminish, rather there is a 
likelihood that new and different problems will emerge.  A clear understanding of what 
these security issues are will help to anchor the importance of discerning the causes and 
will provide possible means of diminishing those causes.   
A. TYPES OF SECURITY ISSUES 
Once admitted to a host country, refugees settle in one of two ways, either within 
an established or soon to be organized refugee camp, or dispersed among the local 
population.  Though the situations vary greatly, the change in dynamics that the refugees 
cause inherently raises concerns about issues of security.   
1. Domestic Security Issues 
The largest factor that may determine the security threat outside of the camp at the 
host state level is whether or not the camp is open for refugees to enter or leave at will.  
The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees provides the rights to wage-earning 
employment and freedom of movement, connoting the right to an open camp.14  This 
situation can present possible economic and social issues leading to increased hostilities 
and decreased security in the host state.   
If the camp isolates the refugees from the host population, it may reduce the threat 
of conflict with the host country citizens, and may protect the refugees from external 
threats.  However, this option severely disadvantages the refugees and compels non-
assimilation.  Without the ability to procure a living outside of the refugee camp or to 
bring needed supplies and resources into the camp, poverty will become rampant and the 
                                                 
14 “Convention and Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations High Commissioner 
on Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/basics.html (accessed February 5, 2008). 
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climate will become more desperate.15  The destitute and beleaguered population may 
pose situations such as have occurred in Darfur, where conflict surrounding the refugee 
camps has been supplemented by uprisings within the camps.  For instance, “chaos 
engulfed Kalma, one of the largest and most troubled camps” where residents “have no 
food, no safety.”16  While separating refugees from the host society may seem to prevent 
basic tensions related to competition, isolation and poverty have the potential to create 
even more severe security issues. 
A flood of new workers into the host state economy will have several negative 
effects.  First, they can force down wages.  The presence of a large foreign population in 
host states which allow refugees to work will generally create a decline in wages, due to a 
surplus of laborers both skilled and unskilled.  For instance, the Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan were willing to work for lower wages, and thus they took the place of higher 
paid workers.  Then, “a rise in unemployment began further to pit refugees against 
citizens, creating resentment among Pakistanis.” 17 Such a change can begin to affect the 
overall economy of a state. 
In addition to causing changes at the labor level, refugees put a large strain on the 
national budget of a host nation.  As well as paying for the forces that will safeguard the 
refugee camp, that nation has to spend money on a registration process in order to 
identify and account for the number of refugees with in the country.  Where services such 





                                                 
15 “Refugee Deaths Underscore Need to Implement Border Settlement Guidelines,” Refugees 
International, http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/862/ (accessed March 23, 2008). 
16 “Uprising at Darfur Refugee Camp,” New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/08/world/08cnd-
darfur.html?_r=1&hp&ex=1147147200&en=3902a74595c1692c&ei=5094&partner=homepage&oref=slog
in (accessed March 23, 2008). 
17 Susanne Schmeidl, "(Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-Term Implications of the Afghan Refugee 
Crisis," Third World Quarterly 23, no. 1 (February, 2002), 15, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0143-
6597%28200202%2923%3A1%3C7%3A%28SDLIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 (accessed February 20, 2008). 
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drain on a countries ability to provide these utilities exists.  Despite UN relief agencies 
working along with international aid to offset these costs, the added expenses subtract 
funds from other national programs affecting the benefits to national.18 
In some instances, an abundance of support through aid and relief work can also 
create tensions with the society surrounding a refugee camp.  Where a country such as 
Pakistan is receiving help to support the large Afghan population within its borders, it 
does not have the resources to benefit its own poor citizens.  Therefore, “Pakistanis have 
begun to resent the competition” from Afghanis who live “in camps rent-free, draw relief 
benefits and work to supplement their incomes.”19  Apparently, differential treatment 
towards refugees participating in the same economy can elevate tensions. 
Another aspect of refugees living in identified camps that can pose a threat to host 
sovereigns appears to be non-assimilation. When a large population of similar culture and 
shared identity, whether national or tribal, is forced out of its homeland they cling to their 
identity.  One example of this situation is the maintaining of neighborhoods of common 
origin within Palestinian refugee camps.  Establishing a similar geographic grouping and 
layout within refugee camps allows them to maintain common identity and practices in 
their location of displacement.20  As the Palestinians work to maintain their national 
identity and reclaim a unified homeland, the host society discriminates against them and 
they, in turn, create conflict with the society surrounding them, which will be shown 
further in depth later in this thesis.   
Both the economic deterioration and the maintenance of a distinct identity 
separating refugees from the surrounding society generate hostilities towards refugees. 
Hostility may become generalized discrimination and in some cases lead to civil 
                                                 
18 “Operation SafeHaven,” US-Africa.org, http://us-africa.tripod.com/safe.html (accessed March 23, 
2008). 
19 Tom Rogers. “Refugees- a Threat to Stability?” in Afghans in Exile, ed. Josephine O’Connor Howe 
(London: The Eastern Press Limited, 1987), 2. 
20Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Dispair: Palestinian Refugee Camps (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
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violence. 21  For instance, in Pakistan, due to the imbalance in the economic situations, 
“the tensions that have been created have resulted in numerous confrontations and at 
times riots between Afghans and Pakistanis….”22  Another example is the role of 
Palestinian refugees in the Jordanian civil war in 1970.  “Based in the refugee camps, the 
[Palestinian militant faction] virtually developed a state within a state, easily obtaining 
funds and arms from both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting 
Jordanian law.”23  If refugees are perceived as the source of negative change, the fight to 
preserve their culture or distinct identity may facilitate the ease of blaming the foreigners 
for the decline in living standards in the host country.  Furthermore, distinct ethnic 
identity may also pose a threat to internal stability of the host country by altering the 
ethnic and/or sectarian balance particularly in regards to political representation.   
2. International/Regional Security issues 
The problems among refugees and the challenges within the host state can cause a 
great deal of insecurity and thus instability at the interstate or regional level.  Although 
camps are intended to be a place of shelter and protection for the vulnerable, as 
mentioned previously, they can also pose as an operating base for militant entities.  These 
militants can incite a unified response from refugees.  Ultimately, refugee warriors who 
carry the fight back into their home country may provoke an international response.  
Despite the threat they pose to potential recruits in the camp, prolonged and often 
continuously waning conditions with in a refugee camp may cause refugees to begin to 
support warrior refugees, hoping to regain the homeland they lost to war and persecution, 
or to demand rights and assistance for the refugee population.24  
                                                 
21 Susanne Schmeidl, "(Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-Term Implications of the Afghan Refugee 
Crisis," Third World Quarterly 23, no. 1 (February, 2002), 13, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0143-
6597%28200202%2923%3A1%3C7%3A%28SDLIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 (accessed February 20, 2008). 
22 Tom Rogers. “Refugees- a Threat to Stability?” in Afghans in Exile, ed. Josephine O’Connor Howe 
(London: The Eastern Press Limited, 1987), 7. 
23“ Black September in Jordan 1970-1971,” OnWar Armed Conflicts Events Data, 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm (accessed March 20, 2008). 
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Refugees, both new and long standing, also affect international stability through 
their role in perpetuating conflict and expanding security issues. When war strikes at 
home, refugee camps provide a modicum of security, which non-official combatants can 
exploit.  The Rwandan genocide and consequent refugee exodus of Hutu from Rwanda to 
refugee camps in eastern Congo in 1994 is an example of this type of decreasing regional 
stability.  Soldiers and former regime leaders regrouped and established bases within the 
refugee camps “from which they launched cross border attacks against Rwanda.”25  
These cross-border incursions led to retaliatory attacks by Rwanda into Congo territory.  
By these actions, the door to international threats and regional stability concerns is 
opened.  Thus, refugee rebels brought the sovereignty of the host country under attack.  
Clearly, long-existing refugees create dangerous cross border security issues when 
sufficient resolutions for their condition cannot be found.    
Another destabilizing consequence of militant refugees is that of international aid.  
In her book Dangerous Sanctuaries, Sarah Kenyon Lischer identifies a number of ways in 
which aid provides status to refugee combatants.  When warrior refugees can gain control 
of doling out rations or aid workers have to negotiate through them to provide relief, 
these rebels gain legitimacy and refugee aid may be funneled into the war effort.   In one 
instance, “during the Rwandan refugee crisis, militant leaders diverted large amounts of 
aid by inflating population numbers and pocketing the excess.”26  Lisher states, “In 
reality, any humanitarian action in a conflict zone will have political, and possibly 
military, consequences….”27 Furthermore, supplies and money destined to support 
innocent people can become war staples when rebels pilfer aid compounds.  “Thousands, 
if not millions, of dollars of relief resources, including vehicles and communication 
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equipment, are stolen every year.”28  These stolen goods supplied by host and 
international sources sustain the cross-border fight.  
There is a great danger in harboring rebel combatant groups in neighboring states.  
Allowing any sort of militarization within a refugee camp greatly amplifies this threat by 
creating a population base, as well as offering international aid and protection to the 
violent insurgents.  The power of the refugees inside the camp and unchecked cross 
border actions threaten regional security and the sovereignty and stability of the host 
state. 
B. CAUSES OF SECURITY ISSUES 
From the occurrences presented here, several common factors may be identified 
as directly influencing security issues.  Many of the difficulties and security risks 
surrounding refugees come from tensions between local and refugee populations due to 
financial strains and cultural difficulties.  Economics, which affects quality of life, is the 
first underlying factor in nearly all instances.  Without sufficient funding poverty among 
refugees climbs, and the resources of the host state and community dwindle, decreasing 
the quality of life for nearly everyone, and increasing tensions.  The second component 
influencing the rise of security issues related to refugees is the amplification of cultural 
differences and the lack of sufficient space to integrate into the local culture.  When a 
specific divide is created between the alien group and the host group, host country 
citizens can find it easy to associate growing problems with the foreign group, causing 
increased tensions from both sides.  Another major threat to security comes from the 
presence of combatants in the host country, particularly in refugee camps where they can 
exploit protection and aid.  The development of resistance movements among refugee 
groups can diminish the physical security and the sovereignty of the host country.  An in-
depth evaluation of how refugees both react to personal financial hardship, as well as  
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create financial strain on the host community, and in what ways cultural differences can 
be minimized or accepted to prevent conflict may give insight into ways of increasing 
both national and regional security.  
This chapter has provided an introduction to the types of security issues that 
surround refugees at the camp, national and international levels.  A familiarity with what 
the potential security risks are and particularly what factors influence and/or cause these 
problems will help to understand how national policies towards refugees affect increased 
or decreased national and regional security throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A FRAMEWORK FOR STATE 
REFUGEE POLICIES 
This chapter establishes the intentions developed by the international community 
for refugee protection and care.  Since a refugee is without national representation by a 
state government, the international community through the use of conventions and 
agreements has created a set of guidelines for the ideal and expected treatment of 
refugees.  A review of these agreements will provide background and insight into the 
policies ideal for refugee treatment.      
The right to protection by one’s home nation is an expectation that is commonly 
accepted among the citizens of advanced nations.  For those populations who flee strife, 
or threats to personal security in their country, such protection does not exist.  By the end 
of 2007, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees estimates that there were 
more than 16 million refugees worldwide.29  Thus, without representation by a state these 
people are unprotected in their current location and in the international community.  
Therefore, the international community has realized a responsibility to step up and 
establish the rights and protection that must be afforded to these people.  There is, 
however, a growing gap between the intentions and rights outlined in international laws 
and the policies implemented by host countries.  This chapter will present a brief 
overview of refugee law to reveal the outlook and the protection gap. 
In order to understand the development of international law regarding refugees 
and how it is intended to influence national laws, this section will focus on currently 
applicable bodies and agreements governing refugees.  First, the creation of the United 
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine followed by the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency to support Palestinians in the wake of the creation of Israel will be 
reviewed.  Next, the advent of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and 
the related 1967 Protocol will be discussed to identify international response granting 
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rights and attempting to resolve the situation of resultant refugees following World War 
II.  Also, international agreements specific to the Middle East will be noted.  Lastly, the 
change in interpretation of the 1951 UN Convention and creation of more recent 
international legislation will be examined in the realization of security issues resulting 
from new and protracted refugee situations.  Through these examinations, the changing 
response of the international community governing refugees will be shown and the 
intended responsibility of states will be identified. 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSES THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION 
In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly established the United 
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) with the intent to provide 
protection to and solutions for the Palestinian displacement.  The Commission’s purpose 
was to attain, through negotiation a resolution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine 
and “to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of 
the refugees and the payment of compensation (para.11).”30  Unfortunately, though 
endowed by the UN with the power to act as an international mediator, this commission 
was unable, like so many after it, to produce the desired truce between the political 
representatives of the Arab and Israeli sides to the conflict.  The failure of the UNCCP to 
fulfill its mandate, eventually lead to its de facto dissolution leaving the Palestinians 
without an international protections regime since 1952.31 
One accomplishment of the UNCCP was the creation of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) under Resolution 302(IV) in December 1949 “to carry out 
direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees” at the recommendation of the 
commission’s Economic Survey Mission.32  This work continues to be accomplished 
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today through administering relief, health, education and social services to refugees in 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank.  
UNRWA coordinates through local governments to provide services directly to 
Palestinians.  Although the UN Relief and Works Agency is the longest standing and 
only organization dedicated to one specific group of refugees, its mandate is limited to a 
humanitarian role and thus, UNRWA does not have any political influence or 
responsibility in resolving the status of the Palestinian refugees.33   
B. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL ON THE STATUS 
OF REFUGEES 
Relevant international refugee law begins with the United Nations creation of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in December 1950 to protect 
and assist refugees.  A unique characteristic of this organization was the endowment by 
the UN General Assembly with the power for “promoting the conclusion and ratification 
of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application 
and proposing amendments thereto” and to create special agreements with individual 
governments to “improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring 
protection.”34  In this way the UNHCR had the direct ability to affect changes and make 
agreements that would benefit refugees rather than limiting it to strictly mandated roles.   
An example of this new ability promotes protection for the rights of refugees, 
which was first granted to the UNHCR, is demonstrated by the 1951 UN Convention on 
the Status of Refugees.  The 1951 Convention’s “principal objective was always the 
regulation of issues of legal status and treatment, rather than the grand design of 
universally acceptable solutions.”35  This convention applies the term “refugee” 
universally such that identification of a refugee could be applied individually rather than 
to the previously typical mass ethnic displacements through World War I and II.  
                                                 
33 “Frequently Asked Questions,” UNRWA, http://www.un.org/unrwa/overview/qa.html#a (accessed 
October 24, 2008). 
34Volker Türk, “The Role of UNHCR in the Development of International Refugee Law,” in Refugee 
Right and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, ed. Frances Nicholson and Patrick 
Twomey (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 160. 
35 Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 149. 
 20
However, article 1.D of the Convention stipulates that “this convention shall not apply to 
persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other 
than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees” which by majority 
interpretation excludes those refugees under mandate and care of UNRWA.36  The 
convention specifically set forth the rights of refugees in general and provided a legal 
framework for their international protection.  Where previous international agreements 
and bodies were typically concerned with alleviating refugee situations they were also 
mandated to refugee organizations by higher authority leaving them limited in their 
power to affect change. 
The provisions of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees cover both 
the rights and responsibilities of refugees.  First a refugee is obliged to be law abiding in 
the host country.  It continues by addressing juridical status, gainful employment, rights 
to welfare (housing, education, and rationing) on par with citizens, and the ability to 
move freely and choose their place of residence.  In addition to these clauses, the 
convention delineates a number of administrative refugee rights and state responsibilities.  
In essence, the convention presents the ideal conditions and interactions between refugees 
and host countries where in most cases refugees are accorded at least the benefits 
extended to legal aliens, but more often those on par with citizens.37 
Although the UNHCR was established with a sense of permanency, this original 
convention was bound by time by characterizing refugees “as a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951,” and/or geographic location because on ratification each state had 
to specify either “events occurring in Europe” or “events occurring in Europe or 
elsewhere.”38  The realization that refugees would not go away had come, but the change 
in legislation to encompass all refugees would be slower to evolve.   
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In response to the growing number of refugee situations since the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and to the worldwide nature of the 
conditions, the UNCHR began to raise the question of removing the limitations of the 
1951 Convention.39  The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was the final 
product, which eliminated the constraints of time and place on applicability of the rights 
and responsibilities granted by the 1951 convention to the emergence of new groups of 
refugees.   
C. MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
The League of Arab States ratified the Casablanca Protocol in 1965 addressing 
some of the major issues facing Palestinians in the Arab countries.  These primary 
concerns included the right to employment equal to that of citizens as well as to obtain 
visas and documents necessary to travel between countries and to return to their current 
host country.40  In addition to the explicitly stated rights, derived and intended freedoms 
include “to unite with family members, to own private property, to benefit from a wide 
spectrum of international human rights guarantees.” 41  The Casablanca Protocol is “the 
most comprehensive document regulating issues arising from the Palestinian presence in 
the Arab world,” however, the acceptance of these rights is agreed to and employed to 
varying degrees by the member nations of the Arab League.42 
Shortly after the 1967 Protocol, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) moved 
to address the refugee problems on the African continent such as the one in Rwanda.  
This convention was novel in as much as its definition includes those who “flee to get 
away from war and civil war, natural catastrophe and famine as much as to escape 
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persecution at the hands of an oppressive government.”43  The UNHCR worked together 
with representatives of the OAU to consider the situation of refugees in Africa and agreed 
to continue to work together as article 8 of the convention states it is “the effective 
regional complement in Africa of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of 
Refugees.”44 
D. CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS 
The current state of refugees encompasses not only newly arising groups, but also 
the persistence of a large number of refugee situations.  Whereas one hundred years ago 
refugees were a newly recognized phenomenon in the international community, now 
those same groups of people that the world thought would eventually go home are still 
stateless and in need of protection.  Both new and enduring refugees now pose real 
concerns for the international community in light of globalization and increased security 
threats. 
One category of refugees that has created a security threat in itself is the 33 
groups of protracted refugees that, according to the UN, each include more than 25,000 
people who have been outside of their home countries for greater than 5 years.45  A 
number of these situations have remained unresolved for several decades.  Among these 
are the Rwandans who fled ethnic violence; the Afghanis who fled an oppressive 
communist regime, years of civil war and U.S. bombing; and the Palestinians who fled 
Jewish occupied territories following the Israeli declaration of independence.   The 
difficulties in repatriating many of these refugees and the strong ethnic identities that 
hinder integration in host country communities keep these refugees in a state of limbo 
that often coincides with security problems for both the host country and the region. 
                                                 
43 Atle Grahl-Madsen, “Stemming the Tide:  Refugee Law and Policy for a Troubled Age,” in The 
Land Beyond: Collected Essays on Refugee Law and Policy, ed. Peter Macalister-Smith and Gudmunder 
Alfredsson (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 404. 
44 “Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,” African Union, 
www.africa-
union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Refugee_Convention.pdf 
(accessed March 21, 2008). 
45 “Protracted Refugee Situations: Millions Caught in Limbo, With No Solutions in Sight,” United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=2600 (accessed March 21, 2008). 
 23
Refugee flows, such as the Rwandans who fled during the revolution beginning in 
1959 and who were never adequately resettled or able to repatriate, create several direct 
and indirect security threats.  It “was widely recognized that the failure of the 
international community to find a lasting solution for the Rwandan refugees…was a key 
factor that put in motion the series of events that led to” the invasion of Rwanda in 
October of 1990 by descendants of the Tutsi refugees.46  Other security issues that arise 
in long standing situations are “arms trafficking, drug smuggling, trafficking in women 
and children, and the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries.”47  Clearly, 
deteriorating conditions and the struggle to sustain a living as a nearly ‘forgotten’ 
population poses threats that should remind the international community of its 
responsibility to protect these people. 
The realization of these security concerns has influenced the reaction of the 
international community towards refugees around the globe.  The case of protracted 
refugee situations has caused some states to curb the rights of refugees.  The introduction 
to the UN’s State of the World’s Refugees 2006 identifies two negative changes in the 
management of refugees.  One is the “overly restrictive application of the Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol,” and the other is “alternative protection mechanisms that guaranteed 
fewer rights than those contained in the convention.”48  Through reinterpreting the 
previously ratified laws or enacting new ones, various countries are adjusting their 
response towards new and existing refugees.   
One change in applying the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol is the 
growing suspension of the rights expressed within these documents in order to minimize 
the number of refugees or asylum seekers that a country has to consider or accept.  The 
Convention leaves up to each nation the responsibility to determine who qualifies to be a 
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refugee based on the definition that the agreement provides.49  This is one easy area for 
states to affect whether or not they will accept people within their country for if they are 
not a refugee then the state has no obligation to protect them.  A state may adjust the 
parameters for what qualifies as persecution strictly to the five items listed in the 
Convention, rather than allowing the expanded meaning addressed by the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) which includes those who “flee to get away from war and civil war, 
natural catastrophe and famine as much as to escape persecution at the hands of an 
oppressive government,” 50 or it can selectively apply the meaning of “well-founded fear” 
thereby placing the burden of proof on the refugee.51  Through reinterpreting the 1951 
Convention wording, a receiving state can manipulate who is welcome at its door and 
attempt to avoid any accusation of refoulement under international law. 
Another change stems from the burden felt by the host state and the security 
concerns raised by many protracted groups of refugees.   For these reasons some 
receiving countries place a limitation on the rights granted to refugees.  When risk factors 
are high, often, the first reaction is to curtain the refugees’ freedom of movement through 
closing off a camp from the surrounding area.  Although the Convention requires a host 
state to “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of 
residence to move freely within its territory,” many countries practice detaining refugees.  
One example is a law that Germany passed in 1980 “requiring asylum seekers to stay in 
special camps, restricting their freedom of movement…and forbidding them to take any 
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employment for two years.”52  This type of action deters refugees from entering or 
applying for asylum due to the perceived and real lack of appropriate protection and the 
limited opportunities to obtain a sufficient livelihood. 
Another reaction that countries are making in response to the increase security 
risks associated with accepting refugees is to legislate other forms of refugee protection 
preventing them from entering or staying in that country.  While the 1951 Convention 
specifically addresses the principle of non-refoulement, several new concepts attempting 
to regulate the country in which a refugee can apply for permanent residency have 
emerged.  A first example is the principle of “Country of First Asylum.”  This concept 
developed from the Swedish Aliens Act says “a refugee is entitled to asylum in Sweden if 
he needs such protection.”53  This law is intended to return all refugees who stop in 
another country prior to Sweden to that country for asylum application since it assumes 
that ample protection is available in the previous location.  The UNHCR Executive 
Committee (EXCOM) in its 1979 conclusion set out guidelines for helping to determine 
the “Country of First Asylum.”54  Basically, states want to place responsibility on the 
first location a refugee enters and are trying to eliminate the ability of a refugee to choose 
his or her final destination. 
The Safe Third Country concept is a practice, which would also prevent a refugee 
from seeking asylum in a country while coming from or in a country that is considered 
safe.  The United States and Canada signed this agreement in 2004 and it was monitored 
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asylum requests from refugees in the other due to the fact that both are considered safe 
countries and therefore a refugee must apply for asylum in the first country he or she 
reaches and does not have the right to choose a final country of asylum.55    
Most recently, refugees, specifically groups of protracted refugees, are viewed 
primarily as a security risk.  A growing concern for border security either from cross 
border attacks by militant refugees or from the possible entry of terrorists or drug 
smugglers, has caused the emergence of a number of new laws and agreements 
predominantly at the national, but also at the international level, restricting the movement 
and entry of refugees into countries of potential asylum.  The shift from refugee focused 
legislation through addressing the obligation to protect and provide rights, to the current 
concern for the security of the host country above that of the refugee, reflects a response 
to perceived refugee created issues rather then legislation that aims to prevent such 
problems.  With out a doubt refugees will continue to flee dangerous situations and so 
long as they cannot return and they cannot find an open country for resettlement, security 
issues will continue to fester.  The general question becomes can these problems be 
minimized through focusing on integrating policies. 
This chapter demonstrated, first, how the international community reacted to the 
1948 exodus of the Palestinians, and next, what the optimal treatment for refugees should 
be as determined by the international community.  Furthermore, this chapter established a 
framework for state policies through the intended integrating treatment and 
responsibilities outlined in the reviewed international agreements.  Refugee laws at the 
national level must acknowledge the host country’s responsibility to provide proper 
identification and protection for refugees, allow for freedom of movement, the ability to 
achieve a livelihood sufficient for adequate living standards, and to prevent non-
refoulement.  Through examining the policies of Lebanon, Egypt and Syria that affect 
refugees this thesis will seek to identify potential preventative and integrating as opposed 
to problematic and isolating policies to increase security for host countries and refugees. 
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IV. POLICY AND REFUGEE RESPONSE IN LEBANON 
This chapter will demonstrate a connection between Lebanese policy towards 
Palestinian refugees and the security related issues the Lebanon has struggled with since 
1948.  This country’s policies will be identified and the resulting conditions for the 
refugees will be noted.  Lastly, security dilemmas involving the Palestinians and their 
relationship to these refugees will be identified. 
Lebanon is a country characterized by deep sectarian lines and a delicate balance 
between the various religious groups.  After the initial support for Palestinian refugees in 
the years directly following the events of 1948, fear that any permanent settlement by 
Palestinians would drastically alter the precarious balance between the existing 
communal groups caused the Lebanese to look at the refugees as a major threat and a 
matter of security rather than a situation of humanitarian crisis or rights.  Viewed as a 
threat, the government has continuously employed policies that objectified and isolated 
the Palestinian refugees.  Although less prominent at the very beginning, this has been a 
true factor in the treatment of the Palestinian refugees since their first arrival in Lebanon.  
There are currently 409,714 Palestinians living in Lebanon and registered with the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).56  The original influx of refugees 
to Lebanon began slowly with the wealthier middle class Palestinians who had previous 
connections to Lebanon and sought to ride out the expected finite violence at home in 
safety abroad.  When the violence of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war occurred, nearly 100,000 
Palestinians fled to Lebanon, mostly settling in the border regions.57  They were initially 
helped by generous Lebanese citizens, the International League of Red Cross Societies 
and state land and resources to support aid agencies.  With the beginning of UNRWA 
operations in 1950, primary care and services were provided by the United Nations 
through refugee camps.  
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The end of the Palestinian Mandate on May 15, 1948 and the events that 
displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to make way for the new Jewish state 
created a situation that to this day affects the stability and security of neighboring 
Lebanon.  Although the Lebanese opened its borders to the influx of refugees, neither the 
Palestinians nor the Lebanese saw the Palestinian presence as permanent.  This allowed 
Lebanon to prevent the integration through means of permanent settlement or citizenship 
of the majority of the refugees, without complaint or objection by the Palestinians.  
However, over the course of the past 60 years, the persistent policy by Lebanon of non-
integration in nearly every aspect of Lebanese society has contributed to the isolation of 
the Palestinians in Lebanon, and ensuing negative security consequences. 
A.  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INFLUENCES 
Lebanon stands in a legal gap in regards to international and national refugee and 
asylum law.  Since this country is not party to the predominant United Nations 
Convention on the Status of Refugees nor the 1967 Protocol, Lebanon does not 
acknowledge the expected rights and responsibilities to which refugees should be 
entitled. 58  Although not party to the main international agreements governing the 
treatment of refugees, Lebanon is not entirely free of protection for refugees.   
Lebanon is party to several other agreements that should both directly and 
indirectly influence its policies towards the treatment of refugees.  First, the principle of 
non-refoulement is a “fundamental humanitarian principle” and has been recognized as a 
principle of customary international law binding on all states.”59  Through this principle 
Lebanon cannot force any Palestinian to return to Israel.  However, while stateless, the 
lack of acknowledgement of refugee rights at an international level leaves refugees 
subject to the national laws existing in Lebanon.   
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Second, the provisions of the 1965 Casablanca Protocol minimally address this 
void of the accepted use of international law.  Lebanon is party to the Casablanca 
Protocol of 1965; however it makes reservations to aspects of each article and to two of 
the articles in their entirety.60  Through reservations expressed at the time of signing, 
Lebanon tied the rights to work and travel to the “prevailing social and economic 
conditions” in the country as well as “in accordance with the laws and regulations in 
operation.”61  At the same time Lebanon declined to provide Palestinians with travel 
documents, or to allow equal treatment as citizens for residency or visa applications.  
Essentially, these reservations to the Protocol make a complete exception to the 
agreement’s purpose to freely allow Palestinians to work and travel on par with the 
citizens of Arab states.  Therefore, although having signed this agreement, Lebanon 
maintains the ability to treat refugees with disregard. 
The conventions to which Lebanon declined to sign and the reservations it has 
made to the agreements it did ratify reflect Lebanon’s primary concern for the highest 
interests of the government.  Without actual legal status under Lebanese law, Palestinian 
refugees are not, in the view of the state, entitled to any rights.  The policies of the 
Lebanese state are determined primarily by the whims of the government and the fears of 
burdens resulting from equal treatment of refugees.  The following discussion will reveal 
that the policies and laws Lebanon has decided to enact regarding refugees are generally 
without guidance or consideration for international laws.  
B. POLICY AND TREATMENT 
1. Prior to 1969  
Initially, the Lebanese government was sympathetic to the situation of the 
Palestinian refugees.  However, once it was clear that there would not be a simple and 
timely solution to the refugee problem, the government began to implement policies to 
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discourage any type of permanent settlement.62  The official status of the Palestinians in 
Lebanese law has never been addressed, leaving the refugees subject to flexible and 
changing legislation and its interpretations. 
For the first several years, the Palestinians did not pose an obvious political or 
security problem for the Lebanese.  “The initial Lebanese rhetoric in the press and by 
government officials cast refugee-host relations as those of guest and host.”63  The 
Palestinians did not hold their host country responsible for their hardship, and the 
Lebanese extended what hospitality that they could.  The refugees’ “preoccupation during 
the immediate postwar years was physical survival…they [sought] self-determination 
outside the countries in which they [lived].”64  As this statement implies, living as a 
refugee was gravely difficult, particularly in light of the fact that the Palestinians and the 
Lebanese sought to avoid any development that could be seen as progression towards 
permanency for refugees within their host country.   
By 1952 UNRWA was charged with organizing and servicing the Lebanese 
refugee camps in which nearly one-third of the refugees lived.  Movement in, out of, and 
between camps was very limited and monitored by permission of the Lebanese forces at 
the camp entrances.  For Palestinians “sharing space, narratives, and experiences set the 
stage for common interests to foment, take shape and become recognized as such.”65  
Pivotal to this period and stemming from the living conditions and treatment of refugees 
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camps.66  This sense of alienation set the stage for the emergence of and dedication to the 
resistance movement that would engender decades of violence.  Peteet describes the 
refugee camps during this period as “sites of waiting and confinement”67  
One initial problem with the acceptance of refugees was the great disparity in 
treatment.  A number of refugees, particularly the middle class with economic and 
familial relations in Lebanon, as well as Christian Palestinians, were welcomed and 
offered advantages that many Palestinian refugees did not.  For instance, “Lebanon 
offered the children of middle-class Palestinians excellent educational facilities for career 
advancement, whereas the education and training of “camp Palestinians” was greatly 
restricted.”68  Also, the Orthodox Church, essentially segregating what were in their 
country of origin integrated Palestinian villages, gave sectarian-based relief to Christian 
refugees.  In addition, Christian Palestinians were granted citizenship by the state, which 
“beyond access to the Lebanese education and health care system, the protection of a 
state and residential stability were undeniably valued assets.”69  The dominant Maronite 
Christian sect accomplished the harboring of refugees through citizenship presumably to 
maintain a confessional majority through an increased Christian population.70   
Early on, the Lebanese government did not tightly restrict economic options for 
the refugees.  During this time, Palestinians who had arrived with resources and/or had 
prior business connections in Lebanon were able to settle in urban areas and attempt to 
build businesses.  Working class refugees created competition in several sectors of the 
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job market for Lebanese citizens.  It came to the point that “Lebanese elite and upper 
classes nervously perceived a potential economic challenge from Palestinian capital.”71  
The 1960s marked the beginning of mobilization among the Palestinians in 
Lebanon. Concern had grown about the influence of refugees and their potential 
alignment with the various sectarian Lebanese groups. The Palestinians “were 
establishing political institutions and military bases inside their refugee camps.  Unlike 
the situation of Palestinians elsewhere, they were free to organize politically and 
militarily as they chose.”72  The Lebanese government exercised control through policing 
the camps and “all aspects of refugee life related to ‘national security’ while the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency provided food, supplies, education and other necessary 
requirements.73  
The Lebanese government from the time of President Fouad Chehab (1958-1964), 
began to implement and maintain “a variety of restrictive measures as part of Beirut’s 
undeclared policy of preventing their integration and encouraging emigration.”74  During 
his leadership Lebanon established a secret police to monitor “and repress refugee 
political activity, fearing both Israeli reprisals and a demographic upset in Lebanon’s 
sectarian balance with the influx and subsequent politicization of the largely Sunni 
Muslim refugee population.”75 
Overall, the period from 1948 through the late 1960s was a period of survival for 
the Palestinians in Lebanon.  Though accepted into the country, any resemblance of 
permanency was avoided or forbidden, and the identity developed among the refugees 
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was one of “unwanted outsider.”  The restrictive policies, “camp residence, poverty and 
dependence on UNWRA rations had a ghettoizing effect,” and created frustration among 
the refugees.76  Following the failure of the Arab states in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
policies of political repression and the restriction of pro-Palestinians movements across 
the region created a change the Palestinians in Lebanon.  In Lebanon, the suppression of 
political mobilization was trumped by the surge of Palestinian guerilla activities and 
support for political activism among the refugees.   
2. 1969 to the PLO Expulsion in 1982 
The next phase of policy and resultant security issues in Lebanon was motivated 
by the signing 1969 Cairo Agreement, which allowed the establishment of the PLO in 
Lebanon, providing bases for attacks against Israel, and a significant degree of autonomy 
for the refugee camps. This agreement was as negative for Lebanon as it was beneficial 
for the Palestinians.  On one hand, the Accord afforded the Palestinian refugees the 
following privileges: 
1. The right to work, residence, and movement for Palestinians currently residing 
in Lebanon; 
2. The formation of local committees composed of Palestinians in the camps to 
care for the interests of Palestinians residing in these camps in cooperation with 
the local Lebanese authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty; 
3. The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle [PASC] inside 
the camps for the purpose of cooperation with the local committees to ensure 
good relations with the Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task 
of regulating and determining the presence of arms in the camps within the 
framework of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution; 
4. Palestinians resident in Lebanon are to be permitted to participate in the 
Palestinian revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the 
principles of the sovereignty and security of Lebanon.77 
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The first of the four provisions theoretically granted the refugees greater rights than ever 
before in the areas of work, residence and movement.  While the second three gave 
control of the refugee camps to the Palestinian Revolutionary Movement and allowed the 
Palestinians to plan and carry out attacks against Israel in coordination. 
The Palestinian Resistance Movement quickly consolidated power and began to 
develop “social and cultural institutions, organs of self government and security, and a 
powerful economic presence.”78  Lebanese security forces ceased to enforce laws or 
patrol inside of the Palestinian refugee camps, and under PLO control refugees began to 
feel a sense of safety within the camps.79  The borders of the camps pushed outwards as 
multilevel cement buildings took the place of temporary structures.  Social services 
skyrocketed, offering Palestinians employment through PLO organizations, and the PLO 
was also able to offer compensation to families whose members were killed in the 
resistance movement.  This period was one of relative prosperity in which Palestinians in 
Lebanon maintained greater freedom and mobility than in any other areas of exile. 
While the Lebanese could not manage to stop the militarization of its refugee 
camps, it went a step further in 1969 when it began coordinating with the PLO.  By 
allowing the concentrations of Palestinians autonomy, Lebanon essentially allowed the 
presence of a “state within a state,” and the actions of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization against Israel threatened Lebanon’s security in addition to its sovereignty.     
This combination of factors, allowing the militants to run refugee camps and to attack 
Israel, drew retaliation not only on the Palestinians but on Lebanese citizens as well. Also 
during this period, the PLO advanced as a political power within Lebanon and began to 
sponsor financially and militarily left wing groups leading to resentment from the 
dominant Maronite Christians and right-wing parties.80 
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The increased tensions “and resentment from vast sectors of Lebanese society, 
particularly the Christians and Shi’ite communities” that resulted from Palestinian 
autonomy and the physical and theoretical threats it posed in turn caused attacks on the 
refugee camps from factions within Lebanon.81  In this way, the Cairo Agreement itself 
became a reason for conflict.  Under attack by right-wing militias, the Palestinians fought 
back to “defend their existence and the quasi-autonomy granted them under the Cairo 
Accords.”82  Since through this agreement the Palestinians had gained rights as refugees 
not previously or otherwise granted to refugees, as well as relative autonomy, it was 
cause for the Palestinians to defend their principles against any threat by the opposing 
Lebanese government or militias.  
“This agreement was a political victory for the Palestinians.  At the same time, by 
renouncing right of sovereignty the Lebanese state had obtained no more than an 
important breathing-space.”83  During this period the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
experienced better conditions than anywhere else in exile.  “They, [the resistance 
movements], built a network of Palestinian social institutions and community 
development projects in health, education, recreation, and vocational training” within the 
camps, which “nearly superseded those of UNRWA in all but education.”84  Although 
highly beneficial to the refugees, the development of these institutions and the 
effectiveness of the Palestinian Resistance Movement posed a real threat to the Lebanese 
government.  Ironically, it was not the Lebanese government who curbed the 
Palestinians’ power and influence, but the 1982 invasion by Israel to force out the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization.  
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“Unfortunately, because the Cairo Agreement tied civilian rights to the PLO’s 
armed activities, the refugees’ status in the country deteriorated as the PLO was 
embroiled in the Lebanese Civil War after 1975.  In 1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
forced the PLO from Beirut.”85  Although the initial agreement provided benefits to the 
Palestinians, “the freedom of movement, residency and labour rights remained tied to the 
Cairo Agreement and never became national legislation.”86  This would prove 
detrimental when the PLO was no longer in control of the refugee camps, again leaving 
the Palestinians vulnerable in their still unprotected status under Lebanese law. 
3. 1982 to the Present 
The intense and protracted violence over nearly two decades in Lebanon led to 
policy that was only more constraining on the Palestinian refugees than during the early 
years of “hosting” and the nearly autonomous years under the Casablanca Protocol and 
organization of the PLO.  Peteet points out that “in the post-war period Lebanon’s 
implicit goal with regards to refugees is to marginalize them spatially, economically, 
politically and socially in their now densely bound refugee camps.”87  Poverty continues 
to be rampant, while the insecurity surrounding the refugees only increases both outside 
and within the camps.   
In order to reinstate the policy of isolating and once again subjugating the 
Palestinians, the size of the refugee camps have been reduced to their approximate 
original 1948 boundaries and, once again laws “ban[ned] the construction or repair of 
existing buildings despite severe damage” to some camps and complete razing of others. 
88  In addition to overcrowding due to population growth and to influxes of new refugees 
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fleeing dangerous conditions outside, infrastructure is either non-existent or highly over 
taxed making living conditions far less than adequate to this day. 
Discrimination against Palestinians is deeply entrenched in Lebanese law.  
Explicit laws have been enacted to almost entirely prevent Palestinians from being able to 
legally hold a job, leaving them without access to legitimate pay or benefits.89  These 
laws originally only affected the poorer refugees, while professional and upper middle 
classes were only marginally inhibited.  However over time like were expanded to affect 
all Palestinians without citizenship.  The way in which work laws pertaining to 
Palestinians are structured is a systematic denial of rights. 90  First, being described as 
foreigners, Palestinians like other foreign or migrant workers, are required to apply for 
work permits, which are difficult to obtain and are revocable at any time.  Next, 
legislation was passed in 1964 and 1995, preventing Palestinians from working in more 
than 70 professions.91  This number was reduced to approximately 20 in June 2005, 
however legalization still makes Palestinians less desirable due to the increased 
paperwork and tax burden on employers.92  Lastly, reciprocity laws require the same 
treatment for non-national workers that Lebanese citizens employed in the non-national’s 
home country would provide. Palestinians in Lebanon are essentially isolated from 
participation in the Lebanese economy through these laws, which effectively prevent 
them from obtaining legal jobs. 
Young Palestinians are guaranteed free primary education in the Lebanese 
system, and although they can receive primary education through UNRWA it is very 
difficult to enter secondary school outside of the limited UNRWA opportunities.  Even if 
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they are able to gain admission, many young Palestinians are forced to drop out to help 
support their families.  Furthermore, motivation to obtain higher education has declined 
in light of the highly restricted job opportunities.  Amnesty international reported that 
Palestinians feel that their time would be “wasted as they would not be able to use such 
education to gain a living in Lebanon.”  The overall decline in education level has had a 
detrimental affect on the Palestinian community as a whole.  Haddad and Jamali state 
that, “The resulting lack of education has jeopardized the economic independence and 
productivity of Palestinians.”93  Clearly, the economic repression of the refugees is 
degrading both to their motivation and their ability to achieve a living. 
A law was also passed in 1969 prohibiting Palestinian refugees from owning or 
buying land.  Any property registered or unregistered that had been purchased prior to the 
enactment of this law was reacquired by the state.94  Furthermore any property that was 
held by a Palestinian automatically reverts to the state upon their death rather than to a 
Palestinian heir.95  This prevents any potential for these refugees to create a stable life for 
themselves, either through opening a business or obtaining a residence.  In this way the 
Lebanese government penalizes these refugees both economically and in terms of camp 
confinement. 
During the 1980s, following the removal of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, continued attacks and purging of Lebanese villages forced many refugees 
to move into the already crowded refugee camps.  A lack of internal security in Lebanon 
for both Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees stems from citizens “who blame the 
Palestinians for their own misfortunes and have a profound sense of grievance after many 
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years of war in Lebanon.”96  From the Lebanese perspective, the refugees are to blame 
for the war and insecurity that has plagued their country.  This attitude is enabled by the 
persistent Lebanese view of the Palestinians as outsiders who, although they share similar 
characteristics with the Arab Lebanese, have established and exercised autonomy over a 
separate culture, a culture which drew Lebanon into war.  
4. Recent Changes 
In recent years, it appears that Lebanon has made attempts to improve the 
situation of Palestinians in Lebanon.  However, the timeliness and effectiveness of these 
efforts has not drastically improved the abject poverty and discrimination that these 
refugees have dealt with for decades.  First, the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding 
with the UNHCR is the only explicit Lebanese document that identifies the existence of 
refugees and asylum seekers.  The most important aspect of the memorandum is that for 
the first time Lebanon acknowledges the right of refugees to be in the country, however it 
does not offer any protection, and after the temporary one-year period detention or 
deportation is possible.97 
In addition to opening previously closed professions, another 2005 legislation 
granted Palestinians born and registered in Lebanon the right to work on par with 
Lebanese counterparts in non-professional jobs, however due to the persistence of 
reciprocity laws this apparent benefit made no difference since a legal Palestinian 
employee would be more costly than available illegal workers.  Therefore, while 
appearing to give rights this legislation left Palestinian workers uncompetitive in the 
labor force.98 
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Beginning in 2006, building supplies were being allowed into the camps under the 
expressed permission of the Lebanese intelligence services.  This is a productive step, 
however it does not address the overcrowding of spaces no larger than the original 
refugee camps of 1948.99  The damaged and in some cases nearly destroyed camps will 
need more than basic building supplies to adequately house and service the camp 
residents. 
C.  SECURITY ISSUES 
The conditions which Lebanese policy has placed on the Palestinian refugees, in 
addition to representing outright discrimination, have largely aided in the development of 
an identity shared by Palestinians that they were and are unwanted outsiders. Undeniable 
tensions were created through fear of the refugees. Any potential absorption into the 
citizenry, which might lead to changes in the political status quo, was prohibited.  The 
Palestinians’ undefined position under Lebanese law resulted in discrimination and 
abuse.  Stuck in a situation of frustration over the inability to regain their lost homeland 
or to sustain an adequate living in the host country, the Palestinian refugees created 
backlashes that continue to have grave consequences. 
The enactment of the Cairo Agreement created a security problem that quickly 
turned into a definite and full-blown security breakdown.  Loescher and Milner state, 
“The direct threats faced by the host-state, posed by the spill-over of conflict and the 
presence of ‘refugee warriors’, are by far the strongest link between refugees and 
conflict.” 100  Although the Palestinians were fleeing the violence and conflict at home 
when they arrived in Lebanon, it was not long before the persistent state of being a 
refugee, as well as the disappointed desire and expectation that they would soon return 
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home, caused the Palestinians to become part of a battle against Israel.  As Loescher and 
Milner further explain the efforts by the Palestinian refugees soon entwined Lebanon into 
a regional conflict.101   
From 1969 to 1982 the refugee camps threatened the physical security and the 
sovereignty of Lebanon and its people, just as much as they implicated Lebanon, 
UNRWA and its supporters in the bolstering of the PLO in the fight against Israel.  The 
refugee camps under control of the PLO and other groups summarized as the Palestinian 
Revolutionary Movement controlled the affairs within as well as independently 
commanded attacks from the camps against a second state and exercised autonomy at the 
expense of Lebanon.102  Furthermore, “the mushrooming of Palestinian power in 
Lebanon, along with domestic communal rifts, eroded the credibility of Lebanon’s 
political, economic and military institutions.”  Lastly, since the camps were supported by 
the United Nations, some accused the member states of complicity in supporting 
unofficial combatants, decreasing regional security through war with Israel. 103 
From the 1982 expulsion of the PLO up until 2000, Israel occupied a larger 
portion of the southern region of Lebanon.  Intended to create a buffer zone from 
Palestinian attacks on Israel, this show of force violated Lebanon’s sovereignty in a 
manner instigated earlier by the refugees who were allowed to arm. The revised and 
elaborate restrictions on movement and employment have the same purpose as in the 
1950s, “surveillance and management and the effect [is] similar, humiliation and 
rage.”104  Once the PLO was removed, conditions for the refugees rapidly decreased to a 
state arguably worse than in the period from 1948 to 1969.  The support from UNRWA is 
financially strained and not near the capability of services once provided by the PLO.  
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One Palestinian lawyer, speaking of the use of laws to attack Palestinians, predicted, 
“The policies of the Lebanese government are going to feed a new round of violence.”105  
This has proven true in continued conflict between the Palestinians and the Lebanese and 
the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
The 2006 invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces provoked through cross-border 
attacks by Hezbollah, a Shi’ite militia organization, can be indirectly linked to the earlier 
refugee security problems.  Hezbollah was formed in 1985 to expel the Israeli occupation 
of a buffer area in southern Lebanon that had been established in 1982.  The cycle of 
attacks and fighting started by the Palestinian revolutionary movements in Lebanon, 
countered by the Israeli occupation, and forced out by attacks from new and continued 
militant groups operating with support from the refugee camps, exemplifies the spread of 
destabilizing conflict from the refugee community to involve the host country in regional 
conflict.  Furthermore, 2007 attacks on several refugee camps by Lebanese armed forces 
have reflected the on-going tensions along sectarian lines and responses to discriminatory 
treatment by militant groups based within the refugee camps.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that the austere and isolating policies, which Lebanon 
implemented against the Palestinian refugees led to desperate conditions for the refugees.  
These conditions, the discrimination shown through the policies governing the refugees 
and the mounting frustration over a lost homeland, helped to cause crippling security 
consequences for Lebanon and detrimental conditions for its neighbors. 
With the creation of the state of Israel, Lebanon acted as a host location for the 
Palestinians, but it did not grant the refuges with the tools––work, rights and living 
conditions to thrive as a community.  The desire to prevent the refugees from settling 
permanently and the squalor of the refugee camps helped to develop a common identity 
among the Palestinians as unwanted outsiders.  Through the Cairo Agreement, Lebanon’s 
change in policy to recognize, empower and arm the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
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and to avail refugee rights imperiled Lebanese control of the country.  In all aspects, this 
policy backfired on Lebanon and degraded national and regional security.  Through 
actively accepting militarized refugee camps, Lebanon gave the Palestinian refugees the 
tools to challenge its sovereignty and involve the country in the throws of both civil and 
regional war.  Since the subsequent ousting the PLO in 1982, the highly repressive 
policies of the Lebanese government and the almost complete confinement of Palestinian 
refugees to crowded camps has done little to curb the violence and discontent of 
Palestinian refugees within Lebanon. 
In this country, the initial fear of changes in religious and political power balances 
that could be provoked by the presence of refugees also instigated a fear of allowing a 
sense of permanency for or identification with the Palestinians.  Rather than attempting to 
find a solution that would provide sufficient livelihood and living conditions for the 
refugees, Lebanon chose to enact policies which were alienating and isolating.  These 
policies resulted in both a separate identity among Palestinians as unwanted, and a sense 
of fear, resentment, and blame by host nationals for the economic challenges they posed.  
Frustration over their situation in Lebanon and the continued lack of progress towards 
returning home escalated to the level of attacks against Israel, which began a continuing 
cycle of violence.  Retaliation from Israel and resentment towards the Palestinians also 
led to internal fighting between Lebanon’s confessional divisions and the Palestinians. 
This cycle of violence has ebbed and flowed at various points, however it is clear that the 
policies that Lebanon chose to employ against the Palestinians and the resulting backlash 
of these policies nearly eliminated security within Lebanon and degraded the peaceful 
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V. POLICY AND REFUGEE RESPONSE IN EGYPT 
This chapter will establish a connection between Egypt’s various policies 
concerning the arrival and treatment of Palestinian refugees and the relatively minimal 
security problems that Egypt faced as a result of the condition and opportunities those 
policies created.   Through this evaluation it will be seen that while policies compelling 
economic isolation might create security challenges, the use of policies to diminish the 
presence of refugees constrain the extent of such security problems. 
The reaction of Egypt to a mass influx of Palestinians was initially open and 
welcoming.  In 1948 the flow of refugees into Egypt arrived by boat through Port Said 
and over land through Gaza.  They continued to arrive through out the year totaling 
approximately 7,000.106  However, in the late 1940s Egypt was experiencing a period of 
economic decline under King Farouk.  The 1947 census placed the Egyptian population 
at an impressive 19 million and steadily growing.  The demand for jobs was not being 
met and there was a growing housing shortage driving prices up.107  Therefore, following 
this initial hospitality Egypt quickly attempted to remove the vast majority of the 
refugees from its territory, while still controlling the refugees that remained within its 
borders to its own benefit.  Again in 1967, Egypt received a flood of people and from 
approximately that time forward, treatment of Palestinian refugees in Egypt has depended 
on the perceived Egyptian solidarity or lack there of with the Palestinian situation.  
Overall, the conduct of Egypt in regards to the Palestinians has been varied, ranging from 
acceptance to avoidance and alienation. 
A. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INFLUENCES 
Egypt has been one of the most ostensibly proactive Middle Eastern countries 
regarding the ratification of international agreements pertaining to refugees.  Although 
Egypt was on the United Nations drafting committee for the 1951 Convention, it did not 
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sign this or the majority of refugee related agreements until the early 1980s.108  These 
agreements include the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee problems in Africa, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, its 1967 
Protocol with reservations to the articles concerning personal status, rationing, access to 
primary education, public relief and assistance, and labor and social security rights.  In 
1984 the president also created a committee for Refugee Affairs to “review asylum 
applications to grant status as per the [1951 United Nations] Refugee convention signed 
in Geneva.”  This committee is not actually known to function, as the UNHCR has been 
unable to transfer duties including the function of identifying refugees.109  Despite 
Egypt’s apparent lack of attention to international refugee law until the early 1980s, it did 
agree to the presence of the UNHCR, which opened its Cairo office in 1954. 
Although willing to sign these agreements Egypt has not always complied with 
their intent or the best interest of its refugees.  Egypt has never allowed UNRWA to 
provide for refugees within its permanent borders.  Palestinians here should be subject to 
UNHCR protection since they do not receive assistance from any other UN agency, 
including UNRWA.  However the lack of application leaves them without specific 
international protections.  This situation was temporarily provided for through the 
implementation of the provisions in the Casablanca Protocol and government policies 
under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser.  Unfortunately, though still a party to each 
of these agreements, Egypt’s national interests have overcome its responsibility to protect 
and care for the Palestinian refugees as will be further explained in this chapter.   
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B. POLICY AND TREATMENT 
1. 1948 Arrival to the Rise of President Nasser in 1954 
The geographic proximity of Egypt to Palestine, in addition to personal and/or 
economic ties, brought Palestinians to seek shelter in Egyptian cities and towns.110  Due 
to the number of refugees during the Israeli War for Independence, Egypt created the 
High Committee for Palestinian Immigrants to care for and establish temporary 
Palestinian refugee camps in 1948.  This committee was overseen by the deputy minister 
of the interior and was made of representatives from the ministries of social affairs, 
health, defense, agriculture and foreign affairs, demonstrating an understanding for the 
wide impact this influx of refugees could have on various aspects of Egyptian society.  
Three camps were initially set up: Abassyieh near Cairo, Mazarita camp near Alexandria, 
and Qantara Sharq camp near the Suez Canal.111  During the month of April, 1948, the 
majority of Palestinians arrived in Egypt through Port Said to an open Egyptian 
reception, as families took in some refugees and relief organizations cared for those who 
were contained in nearby camps.112  Over time, the camps were consolidated and isolated 
from Egyptian society, causing conditions within them to become bleak. 
In 1949, Egypt signed the Rhodes Armistice with Israel, which among other 
stipulations gave Egypt the responsibility for the governing and military protection of the 
Gaza Strip.113  Also, “the signing of the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel 
had made this transfer [from the Mazarita camp to Gaza] possible for the first time since 
the refugees left their homes and lands in Palestine.”114  At this point Egypt began to 
transfer Palestinian refugees to Gaza, partly by demand of the refugees seeking relief 
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from dire camp conditions and wanting to return to their homeland, to Gaza.  For those 
with still within the borders of Egypt, a policy was put into place to “provide funds to 
those who wished to join their families elsewhere.”115  Through this policy, Egypt was 
able to remove hundreds more Palestinians from its area of responsibility 
For any refugees trying to avoid being forced into the already cramped quarters in 
the Gaza Strip, sufficient money was required to prove that a family could support itself 
without acquiring work in Egypt.  Then, only if a refugee could find an Egyptian national 
to sponsor them would he or she would be able to remain and integrate into the Egyptian 
society.116  Until the time that a request for residency could be approved, refugees were 
required to remain in the camps.  “The process itself took time and many of those with 
families outside the camps had to wait months to be reunited.”117  From the start, Egypt 
isolated and detained refugees, and any refugees remaining in the camps were sent to 
Gaza or funded to relocate to other countries in the region.  In no case was Egyptian 
citizenship extended to any of the refugees in Egypt or the Gaza Strip.  Through these 
means, Egypt was able to severely limit the number of refugees maintained within its 
territory.  
At first look, the Palestinians in Egypt may seem integrated into society simply 
because of the lack of refugee camps.  The Egyptian government eliminated the refugee 
camps as soon as possible through active efforts to minimize the refugees’ presence.  The 
government deported some back to Gaza, sent others abroad to stay with family, and by 
discouraged their arrival and/or stay through minimal assistance. The only people 
allowed to remain in Egypt were initially financially capable enough to support 
themselves.  Thus, the Palestinian refugees who stayed were dispersed across the country 
to find housing with relatives and among the local population, and the total Palestinian 
presence was significantly lower than in most other host states.  The broad distribution of 
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Palestinians has contributed to an isolation of refugees similar to that of refugee camps.  
However, instead of concentrating and separating their presence, in Egypt that presence is 
saturated and lost among the host nationals.  In this way, the government influenced one 
distinct aspect of the presence of Palestinian refugees in Egypt, their proportionately 
small quantity. 
In order to assist the situation of Palestinian refugees across the region, in 1950, 
the United Nations created the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).  UNRWA 
created the following definition for its operational purposes,  
Any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the 
period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of 
livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.118 
Egypt only permitted UNRWA assistance to those refugees inside of the Egyptian 
controlled Gaza Strip.  In this way, Egypt was technically in compliance with the United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) by allowing UNRWA to help the 
Palestinians, while preventing the organization to operate inside its own national borders.  
Egypt’s underlying “motivation was the desire not to create suitable conditions for 
Palestinians to remain in the country.”119  In addition to removing refugees from the 
country, denying assistance within their borders demonstrates a way in which Egypt 
discouraged the refugee population from attempting to gain or regain entrance to Egypt.   
During this time, refugees were in a state of limbo and not afforded any rights. 
Though a comparatively small number of Palestinians arrived and remained in Egypt in 
1948 as compared to Lebanon and Syria, Egypt feared the economic burden of refugees 
and the already present shortage of employment.  Of the initial 7,000 refugees who 
arrived in Egypt in 1948 a number of them were wealthy and according to Brand there 
were not enough working class Palestinians to seriously impact the job market for 
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Egyptian workers.120  Despite the probable lack of threat in the job market, those 
Palestinians who had been able to gain access to life in Egypt were not allowed to work 
or open businesses.121  Shortly after arriving, the savings which refugees were relying on 
began to diminish and their inability to work legally caused poverty among the 
Palestinian refugees. 
While not allowing aid from UNRWA within its borders, the Higher Committee 
for Palestinian Immigrant Affairs attempted to alleviate the plight of the refugees by 
transforming into a relief agency to assist Palestinians whose means without employment 
were waning.  Then in 1955, a service organization was appointed to administer a 
program to feed and clothe nearly 7,000 refugees.122  In this way Egypt did attempt to 
provide assistance to the refugees.  Palestinians were not issued Egyptian passports or 
travel documents.  Furthermore, only if a Palestinian had an Egyptian residence permit 
would he or she be allowed to enroll in school.   
In the initial years of exile to Egypt, the refugees waited expectantly for the Arab 
nations to oppose Israel and provide the opportunity to return to Palestine.  There was a 
continuing understanding that the Palestinian-Israeli situation would be resolved through 
the actions of the surrounding Arab nations.  Therefore, for the Palestinians in Egypt like 
Lebanon the early years were about survival, longing and patience.  With the arrival of 
this first wave of refugees, tensions grew around the question of able-bodied Palestinians 
living as refugees.  Egyptians began to view these men as abandoning their homeland, 
and leaving the fight for Palestine to Egyptian and other Arab forces.123  These tensions 
were diminished with the rise of Pan-Arabism and the push for a unified Arab front 
against the new state of Israel. 
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2. The Nasser Era, 1954 to 1978  
When President Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in 1954, he brought with him 
the growing sentiment for Pan-Arabism, including support for the Palestinian cause.  
“Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s was the only Arab state with the political and military 
capability to pursue hegemony in the Arab world and to assume its defense against 
Israel.”124  This position obviously found favor with the Palestinian refugees.  Through 
his Pan-Arab foreign policy of trying to unify the Arab world “the credibility of his 
leadership rested on championing the Palestinian cause and challenging Israel.”125  
Nasser’s promotion of the Palestinian cause resulted more from attempting to maintain 
dominance in the region, and not necessarily from the pressures of the comparatively 
small number of refugees within his territory.  Still, this change in attitude from previous 
rulers had a significantly positive impact on the Palestinians residing in Egypt. 
The Palestinians residing in Egypt encountered a period of relative prosperity 
under President Nasser, often referred to as the “Golden Era.”126  The first changes in 
refugee policy began with the implementation of two laws in 1954 that contained clauses 
specifically addressing Palestinians and allowing them to work in health science 
professions.  Over time further changes in law began to allow resident Palestinians to 
work, whereas previously they had relied only on what they arrived with when they fled 
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citizens to Palestinians settled in Egypt.  Law 66 passed in 1962 entitled Palestinians to 
be appointed to government jobs and to be treated as nationals of the United Arab 
Republic, a brief union encompassing Egypt and Syria.128  
Universities also began to accept Palestinian students free of charge.  This was 
significant as Egypt maintains the oldest and highly respected universities in the Middle 
East.129  This opening allowed for advancement of Palestinians towards professions that 
helped to maintain a high quality of life.  Also, the presence of such a relatively small 
number of Palestinian refugees did not make their political organizing a direct threat and 
the increased popularity for Egypt in allowing them to create their own unions and 
organizations outweighed the security risks.  Hence, during this time Nasser also 
permitted the development of Palestinian civil groups, including the Palestinian Student’s 
Union, which produced Palestinian leaders such as Yassir Arafat.   To ensure minimal 
risk Egypt closely monitored these Palestinian activities. 130 
From the start, Palestinian refugees under Egyptian control experienced limited 
freedom of mobility.  Resident refugees were able to travel within the country, and in 
1960 Law number 28 granted these Palestinians Egyptian travel documents.  Although 
this was an apparent advancement of rights, these documents did not provide for the right 
of return to Egypt from travel abroad without a visa procured in advance.  While staying 
outside of Egypt visas must be renewed every six months to three years, and the lapse of 
a visa could ultimately leave a refugee trapped stateless anew, outside of their temporary 
home.131  
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Over time, a relatively small number of educated Palestinians were also allowed 
to enter Egypt.  For instance, “in 1962, due the worsening economic conditions in Gaza, 
Nasser permitted Palestinians, in particular the educated, to enter Egypt for work in the 
public sector.”132  In 1965, Egypt signed the Casablanca Protocol, which “called upon 
Arab governments to grant Palestinians residence permits, the right to work and the right 
to travel.”133  Clearly, the changes in Egypt’s policies under President Nasser show an 
attitude of assistance and solidarity towards those refugees who managed to stay in Egypt 
following the first Israeli War of Independence, which was a reflection of the Pan-Arab 
nationalism and ideals of the period. 
The second wave of Palestinian refugees left the West Bank during the Arab-
Israeli War of 1967.  In this situation not only did refugees consist of those fleeing their 
homes, but also, any Palestinian who was abroad for work, study, or travel was denied 
any right to return.  The latter group is often referred to as “displaced Palestinians.”134  
Following this war, Egypt hosted several thousand military and civilian refugees, as 
Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, 
and the Golan Heights and again drove the Palestinians out with the threat of violence.  
Since in this situation, Egypt was not able to push the refugees back over the border, 
authorities worked to “distribute the displaced as widely as possible rather than use 
camps.”135  Egypt continued to extend the rights of citizens to the influx of refugees.  
They were given travel documents, the right to work and to establish a life under the 
Nasser regime. 
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Despite not signing the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, Egypt 
reinforced its actual policies towards refugees by supporting the 1965 Protocol for the 
Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States, otherwise known as the Casablanca Protocol.  
The first article of this agreement states that, “Whilst retaining their Palestinian 
nationality, Palestinians currently residing in the land of [Egypt] have the right of 
employment on par with its citizens.”136  It also provided for free travel with League of 
Arab State travel documents.  Since under Nasser Egypt was already acting in accordance 
with the provisions of the Casablanca Protocol, it benefited Egypt’s reputation in the 
Arab world at no cost, to ratify the agreement. 
Nasser not only pushed Palestinian rights as far in their favor as ever in Egypt, but 
he was also concerned for minimizing the risk of involving Egypt in conflict.  “As early 
as 1964, Palestinian raids on Israel had been restricted by Nasser and other Arab leaders 
who feared that fedayeen (guerilla) activities would provoke an Arab-Israeli conflict that 
they were ill prepared to fight.”137  In 1964 the Arab League through Egyptian influence 
also developed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  “The creation of the PLO, 
so patently a device to shackle [the Palestinian movement] under its chairman, Ahmad 
Shiqueiry, a wordy lawyer who had never held a gun, spurred them to set up 
organizations of their own.”138  Under Shiqueiry, the organization was weak and did not 
draw the attention or wide support of Palestinians.  This lead to the creation of new and 
the consolidation under the PLO of new and old groups such as Fatah, the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP), and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP).   
Though not a direct connection between the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, the 
government’s choice to push for legitimization of these Palestinian groups under 
decentralized control led to guerilla attacks.  These attacks were carried out not only 
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against Israel, but also on targets of any country that was not sufficiently sided with the 
Palestinian cause.  One instance was the 1971 assassination of Jordan’s Prime Minister 
Wasfi Tell in a Cairo hotel by the PLFP who has also hijacked four airliners in the 
previous year.139  It is impossible to say that Egypt’s desire to create a puppet Palestinian 
organization is responsible for such incidents, however, its assumption that it could 
control and monitor an international group like the refugees within its territory, if 
inadvertently, led to deterioration of international security.   
During the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s policies favored the 
Palestinians, treating them on a par with Egyptian citizens.  Pro-Arab rhetoric, including 
the goal of reclaiming the state of Palestine from the Israelis, made this period the most 
prosperous for refugees and the most integrated among host nationals.   Defeat by Israel 
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war marked the decline of Egyptian hegemony in the Middle 
East and Egypt experienced an economic down turn.  The cost of exhaustive financing to 
develop and maintain some sort of military dominance to oppose Israel was taking its 
toll.  The Pan-Arab ideology declined as a direct result of the failure of the Arab states 
against Israel in the 1967 war.  All of these factors would soon come to affect the 
situation of the Palestinian refugees living inside Egypt.140 
3. From 1970 to the Present 
Frustration following the failure of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and continuing 
economic difficulties caused Egypt to lose enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause.  The 
change in foreign policy and the tendency towards making peace with Israel also led to 
changes in policies towards the Palestinian refugees.  Once again the rights to work, 
education and state assistance diminished pushing the majority of Palestinians in Egypt 
below the poverty line and preventing them from acting as an effective part of the 
Egyptian economy. The small number of Palestinians spread across the most populated 
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Arab country has made their presence for the most part non-influential.  Due to this 
position in Egypt, the Palestinians have not had a sufficient ability to counter the 
changing policies imposed throughout their stay in Egypt.   
In the late 1970s, the “Golden Era” began its steep decline.  Anwar al-Sadat 
succeeded Nasser as president and sought to eliminate Nasser’s Pan-Arabism and to 
change Egypt’s foreign policy towards Israel.  Egypt sought peace with Israel through the 
Camp David Accords, in order to create a more stable region.  This agreement, which 
was meant to benefit the Palestinians as well by “defin[ing] the powers and 
responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and 
Gaza… [and through a] withdrawal of Israeli armed forces [which would] take place,” 
angered the greater Palestinian community.141   
The first major anti-regime movements posing a threat to Egyptian security arose 
in 1977 following President Anwar Sadat’s announcement of his impending visit to 
Israel, demonstrating the change in attitude from the previous pro-Palestinian rhetoric to 
an apparently pro-negotiation stance.142 As a result of the perceived change in Egyptian 
attitude towards the Palestinian situation, a Palestinian faction group assassinated the 
Egyptian Minister of Culture, El-Sabai, during travel to Cyprus.  Of note in this study is 
that this attack was tied to a shift in foreign policy causing grave political consequences 
between Egypt and the PLO.  The assassin was not a refugee from Egypt nor was the 
shooting prompted by a change or neglect of policy regarding the treatment of refugees, 
but rather due to a change in foreign policy.  This act in turn caused the Egyptian 
government to drastically change its policies towards the Palestinians in Egypt.  Despite 
the fact that the PLO condemned the assassination, Sadat turned against the Palestinians 
in Egypt, and the media commenced a propaganda attack aimed at turning Egyptians 
against the Palestinians.143   
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Benefits for all Palestinians living in Egypt expired in 1978, as relations between 
the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, and the Egyptian government deteriorated.  
“Two administrative regulations, Nos. 47 and 48, were issued, rescinding all regulation 
that gave Palestinians the same rights as nationals.  With these special privileges taken 
away, Palestinians has no more rights than foreigners.”144  Again ignoring previous 
attitudes and the policies expressed in the Casablanca Protocol pertaining to the treatment 
of Palestinians, Egypt acted to suit its own interests using the Palestinian refugees as a 
means for retaliation, rather than with the international concern that it had formerly 
expressed for refugees. 
New laws restricting work significantly affected Palestinian refugees, particularly 
in the case of new workers.  Already employed professionals, PLO employees and civil 
servants were allowed to keep their jobs and the latter two send their children to school 
free of charge.  Other workers and new graduates require permits and are additionally 
limited to no more than ten percent of any company.  This leaves Palestinians to simple 
wage jobs that do not pay or suit their education level.145  A law similar to that in 
Lebanon was passed wherein Egypt would only hire new foreign Arab country nationals 
for work in the public sector from countries who hire Egyptians, clearly restricting the 
qualification of Palestinians for these jobs.  The right to education also became limited.  
Whereas under Nasser, all education was provided free of charge, now not only did 
Palestinians have to pay, but like all other non-nationals, they have to pay in foreign 
currency.  This doubly increased the difficulty of obtaining higher education for 
struggling Palestinians.146   
Two events of the early 1980s, the death of President Sadat in 1981 and the 1982 
invasion of southern Lebanon, caused a renewed sense of sympathy among Egyptians for 
the refugees and the Palestinians as a whole.  Unfortunately, this change in attitude was 
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not effectively reflected in Egyptian policy.  “While Palestinians are relieved that the 
passing of overt repression and anti-Palestinian propaganda that characterized the 1977-
1981 period, the damage to the Palestinian community remains.”147  The two challenges 
mentioned above, limited job opportunities and challenges to education, have ultimate 
lessened the desire among refugees in Egypt to strive for advanced education. 
Despite the creation of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1951, 
these refugees still do not receive United Nations assistance, since previous Palestinians 
who left their homes and livelihood during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War were already 
receiving aid from the UN in other locations and Arab leaders worried that through 
resettlement Palestinians “would lose their identity, and their cause would be diluted.”148 
In addition to the exception for Palestinians, Egypt was not an original signer of the 
convention.  The gap between Egypt’s refusal of UNRWA help within its borders and the 
lack of applicability of the UNHCR allowed Egypt to take responsibility and to handle 
the influx of Palestinians in a manner of its choosing. 
On June 28, 1980, Egypt ratified the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of 
Refugees, which supports all refugees not previously benefiting from UN services.149  It 
declared reservations to articles, 12.1, 20, 23, and 24. (These articles discuss the 
governing of status, the equal rationing of limited goods, relief services, and labor and 
social security laws as afforded to host nationals.)150   The reservations, especially the 
objection to providing relief services and labor, prevent refugees from establishing a 
livelihood and ensures their place as inferior to Egyptian citizens, consequently 
preventing them from effectively participating in society.  “The maintenance of Egypt’s 
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reservations to the [1951 UN] Convention, the lack of national laws on refugees, and the 
unwritten non-integration policy of the Egyptian government have all contributed to the 
hardship of the refugees in Egypt.”151 
Following Palestinian prosperity under Nasser, most of the Egyptian 
government’s policies towards the Palestinians were much influenced by political 
interactions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and reactions to the Palestinian resistance 
movements through out the region.  The decline in standards of refugee treatment 
resulting from restrictive policies did not cause very many security problems.  This is due 
in large part to the smaller numbers of Palestinian refugees in Egypt, and can also be 
attributed to tight regulation of Palestinian civil institutions and the dispersion of refugees 
throughout the country.  The integration of refugees among the larger population limits 
the interaction between them and the ability to organize a large and challenging response 
to their decline in status and livelihood following the events of 1978. 
C. SECURITY ISSUES 
The majority of the security issues that Egypt has dealt with since the 1948 forced 
immigration of the Palestinians to Egypt have been related to the hazards common to all 
countries.  There is not a significant amount of writing or research regarding security 
issues typically associated with the presence of refugees in a host country.  It can be 
loosely argued that allowing the formation of Palestinian civil groups, such as the 
student’s union, produced leaders for Palestinian resistance groups and that the attempt to 
establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization as a proxy or puppet of Egyptian control 
contributed to the development of violent Palestinian factions, which even today threaten 
the peace and stability of the Middle East. 
One possible reason for the lack of security threats related to Palestinian refugees, 
despite the marginalization of the Palestinians in Egypt through government policies 
which led to the lack of legal access to jobs and subsidies from international aid, is that 
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due to early policies causing the wide dispersion and a comparatively small number, the 
Palestinians have not been able to muster sufficient opposition to the state and its 
policies.  Based on the understanding that if refugees are not present they cannot create 
problems, Egypt, by effectively minimizing the number of refugees within its territory, 
may have been able to avoid numerous security problems that would have resulted by 
allowing large numbers of refugees to remain in the country.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates how Egypt’s shifting policies have drastically limited the 
number of Palestinians residing in Egypt, and despite creating both difficult living 
conditions and economic isolation for the Palestinian refugees, those policies have 
effectively decreased the number of refugee-related security issues.  Egypt is not an 
atypical case wherein isolating policies do not correlate to security problems.  Rather this 
case study shows that the strategy for minimizing the presence of Palestinian refugees in 
the country had a substantially greater effect by limiting the refugees’ ability to challenge 
the treatment and conditions imposed by the government.  Unfortunately, this is not a 
policy option currently available to most host countries, due to the customary 
international law practice of non-refoulement. 
Palestinian refugees in Egypt are, in fact, more integrated than in Lebanon, 
however they have still been isolated economically by Egyptian policies, with the 
exception of a period of time under the Pan-Arab ideals of President Nasser.  The 
fluctuations in Egypt’s policy towards allowing refugees to work and the eventual 
elimination of subsidies they received have had the largest isolating effect on the 
Palestinians.  Overall, Egypt’s policies more often reflected the national interests of the 
country, and not the welfare of the refugees.  These policies left the Palestinians isolated 
through dispersion, poverty and the fluctuating employment and financial circumstance.  
Throughout this time, these refugees have remained without international aid 
from the United Nations. Egypt may currently be party to more international agreements 
concerning refugees, but in the case of the Palestinians living in Egypt, the provisions of 
each agreement have been applied intermittently and in the best interests, not of the 
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refugees but of the host country.  Egypt’s desire to discourage the presence of refugees 
allowed for UNRWA only in the Gaza Strip, which it occupied.  Then in attempts to keep 
the Palestinian situation a prominent eye sore and reminder for the international 
community, Egypt has not allowed the UNHCR to assist the Palestinian refugees.  
Ironically, Oroub El-Abed describes the refugees in Egypt as “The Forgotten 
Palestinians.”152  Clearly, the refusal to allow United Nations assistance and protection 
has been a real disadvantage for the Palestinians. 
The Palestinian refugees in Egypt are not truly integrated into society, but rather 
they are a group of refugees who have experienced the rise and fall of living conditions 
based on the whims of Egypt’s national and international best interests.  As a group too 
small to effectively present a challenge to the state they are dependent on the actions of 
the larger diaspora for which they may feel the retaliation of the Egyptian government.  
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VI. POLICY AND REFUGEE RESPONSE IN SYRIA 
This chapter will establish a connection between Syria’s integrating policies 
concerning living conditions, freedom of movement, and employment, and the minimal 
security issues that surrounded the Palestinian refugees.  This chapter will provide show 
that through treating the refugees nearly equal to citizens they acted and responded to 
fluctuating conditions in the country similar to host nationals and without a proclivity for 
violence or creating other detrimental security concerns.    
Syria is currently the temporary home to more than 400,000 Palestinian refugees, 
the majority of who arrived following the violence related to the founding of the state of 
Israel in Palestine in 1948.153  These refugees comprise approximately three percent of 
the total Syrian population.  There currently exist 14 refugee camps, of which UNRWA 
recognizes only 10.  Fortunately, due to positive financial gains over the past 60 years, 70 
percent of refugees live outside of the camps in integrated urban areas, particularly in and 
surrounding Damascus.  Over the course of 1948, approximately 95,000 Palestinians 
arrived in Syria.154  Although Syria wanted to return the refugees, primarily as opposition 
to the actions of Israel, it did not press the refugees to leave.  In actuality, of the countries 
surveyed here, Syria will prove to be the most accommodating towards the Palestinians in 
its territory.   
A. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INFLUENCES 
Syria is not party to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
or its 1967 Protocol.  Despite not signing this agreement, Syria has effected nearly all of 
the provisions it contains when dealing with the Palestinian refugees of 1948 through 
national laws.  “The uniqueness of the Palestinian refugee in Syria is mainly related to the 
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legal status for the refugees.  The aftermath of such status is a greater extent of 
incorporation of refugees without affecting their national citizenship or identity.”155  This 
concept will prove very effective for minimizing security problems.   
In 1965, Syria ratified the Casablanca Protocol, which in theory gave all 
Palestinians in League member countries the rights to residency, freedom of movement 
and employment without threat to their Palestinian identity or right to return.  While 
already granting most of these rights to Palestinians, a change in laws denying citizenship 
further ensured that Palestinian identity would be maintained.156  Unlike most other 
ratifying countries, including Lebanon and Egypt, Syria has consistently complied with 
the provision of the Casablanca Protocol.   
B. POLICY AND TREATMENT  
1. From 1948 to 1982 
In 1949, the Syrian government created the Palestine Arab Refugee Institution 
(PARI) to provide for all aspects of refugee settling including “setting up refugee 
registers, providing relief, finding suitable employment and processing all contributions 
intended for refugees.”157 Later this organization was transformed into the General 
Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR), which registers refugees with Syrian 
travel documents and provisional ID cards.  According to GAPAR 85,000 Palestinians 
fled to Syria in 1948.158  This institution now works along side UNRWA to provide 
services and care for the Palestinians in Syria.   
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Initially, refugees were distributed to empty military barracks across Syria.  
Several of these camps were temporary and others became permanent, expanding and 
transforming tents and open barracks to mud and cement houses.  In a number of 
situations such as the camps at Aleppo and Hama, the Syrian government granted 
additional land and the financial assistance to establish these more permanent quarters.  
For instance, when heavy rains washed out the tent settlements at Hay Al-Ameen, 
GAPAR announced that families would be moved to Yarmouk camp and given 700 
Syrian pounds to build their own homes.159  These situations of support and expansion of 
the refugee camps expressed the welcoming and open policy of the Syrian government 
towards the 1948 arrival of the Palestinians. 
A large number of services were made available to the refugees in Syria shortly 
after their arrival in Syria and most of them continue today.  Inside the refugee camps the 
government provided basic utilities, including water and electricity.  UNRWA augmented 
these utilities with “environmental services” such as sewage and garbage disposal and 
infestation control.160  Syria continues to assist and integrate refugee settlement as, for 
example, Syria’s decision to incorporate the unofficial Ein el-Tal camp into the master 
plan for developing the neighboring city of Aleppo.  Healthcare is supplied to the 
Palestinians through a number of sources.  In addition to being eligible for Syrian 
government health services equal to citizens, Palestinians can receive care from UNRWA 
clinics and collaborated efforts by the international Red Cross, the Palestinian Red 
Crescent and other religious-based charities.161 
From the beginning of the influx of refugees in 1948, Syria sought to incorporate 
the refugees as much as possible.  The most significant step in this policy was to pass 
Law Number 260 in July of 1956.  This law states, 
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Palestinians residing in the territory of the Republic of Syria on the date of 
the promulgation of this Law shall be considered as Syrians by origin 
regarding all provisions in the Laws and Regulations in force concerning 
employment, work, business and military service without prejudice to 
their original nationality.162 
This law implemented by the Ministers of State and still in effect today, alleviates the 
need for foreign working permits and allows for integration of Palestinians into the 
Syrian workforce.  It alleviates the potential for systematic and black-market labor 
discrimination and minimizes the potential for poverty based on unemployment.  
Furthermore, due to the fact that Palestinian refugees and Syrians share the same labor 
pool with the exception of the agricultural and service industries, (Palestinians can own 
land for residence and can rent space for business purposes, but they are not allowed to 
own land for agricultural production), it is arguable that “Palestinians refugees suffer the 
same economic difficulties all Syrians face.”163 
Palestinians in Syria are granted freedom of movement through out the entire 
country.  In regards to international travel several laws have been passed.  First, in 1960 
under Nasser and the United Arab Republic Palestinians were given Palestinian Travel 
documents.  Later in 1963, the Syrian government issued the Syrian laissez-passer to 
Palestinians registered with the General Administration for Palestine Arab Refugees, 
which, like a national passport is renewable every six years and allows re-entry to Syria 
without a visa.  According to a law passed in 1999, they are also able to travel to and 
from Lebanon solely on their Syria identity cards.164  Recently, Syria has become more 
restrictive of the entrance of Palestinians from other Arab countries so as to prevent 
further settlement of refugees. 
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Palestinians have received the same rights to work as citizens of Syria.  They are 
not excluded from jobs in any sector and most government position.  The ability of the 
Palestinian refugees to work and the fluid nature of movement between the camps and 
neighboring cities allowed for an increased level of economic integration in Syria.  
Hamad Said Al-Mawed describes one circumstance saying, “Considering the high 
standard of construction and services in Yarmouk camp, one should look upon the camp 
as an integral part of Damascus city.  The camp has become an important commercial 
center.”165 Another study states, “As an economically integrated segment of the Syrian 
population, the household economy of Palestinian refugees is more affected by the 
general characteristics of the Syrian national economy than circumstances specific to the 
refugees as a group.”166  These statements indicate not only participation of the 
Palestinian refugees in the Syrian economy, but that their contribution makes up a 
consequential piece of the economy. 
The government has not restricted the development of Palestinian organizations 
(any more than indigenous ones) in Syria; however, their importance has been less than 
in other host countries.  “As a result of the degree of Palestinian integration and the 
nature of the Syrian political system, Palestinian popular organizations in Syria have 
tended to be weak and only marginally active.”167  Since Palestinians were involved 
along side of Syrian nationals in labor unions, they possessed a shared cause and struggle, 
which minimized any struggle between the refugees and the host citizens.  As Loescher 
and Milner discuss, in this instance refugees are not seen as a threatening “outgroup.”  
Integration of workers and participation in common civic groups has prevented a 
distinction between the two groups, and therefore the Palestinians here are not 
scapegoats. 
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Syria has also strictly monitored Palestinian political activity.  The government 
creation of Saiqa, the Palestinian political and militant branch of the Ba’athist party, 
combined with Syria’s dedication to the Palestinian struggle against Israel, has prevented 
the refugees from uncontrolled attacks from Syria against Israel.  “Syria kept close 
control of Palestinian political activity and often attempted to subsume the Palestinian 
national cause to that of the Syrian state.” 168   
Being treated on par with citizens has also meant that Palestinians residing Syria 
have been obligated to perform military services.  Whether aware of the possible tensions 
that could have developed by host nationals towards the refugees for seeming not to fight 
their own battle, Syria alleviated this problem through a service obligation.  Furthermore, 
once the Palestinian Liberation Army was established in 1964, Syria augmented this 
force with Palestinians from its own service.169 
2. Palestinian Treatment after 1982 
When Israel invaded Southern Lebanon in 1982, several thousand Palestinians 
traveled north to take refuge in Syria due to the fighting and calculated attacks on the 
Palestinian camps there.  These Palestinians unlike those who arrived in 1948 “were not 
entitled to employment, education or other privileges on the same basis as Syrians.”170  
Both refugees in Syria and in Lebanon prior to the 1982 influx were accustomed to a high 
level of social services provided by the Syrian government or the PLO in control of the 
Lebanese camps respectively.   
The new arrival of Palestinians, combined with a downturn in the Syrian 
economy, caused Syrians for the first time to look to the refugees as the cause of waning 
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conditions in Syria.  Unemployment rates increased among Palestinian refugees after the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon caused the PLO to withdraw and close their establishments in 
Syria as well, eliminating associated jobs.  Later, following the first US-Iraq war in 1991, 
an influx of Palestinian workers forced out of the Gulf States saturated the labor 
market.171  However, to this point, the literature has not indicated any particular refugee 
related security threats. 
C. SECURITY ISSUES 
For the duration of the presence of Palestinian refugees in Syria, the largest 
threats to Syrian security have come from international war and political regime 
interaction.  Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel and Syria continued to clash 
along the border separating them.  These attacks were a result of political and territorial 
differences, Israel showing force and attempting to expand the territory it had gained 
through UN resolutions and through hostile take-over, and Syria protecting its 
sovereignty.  Therefore, Syria’s proximity and sovereignty concerns, in addition to anti-
Israel sentiments, were the main causes for continued opposition to the Israelis.  It was 
not any compulsion by the Palestinian refugees residing in Syria.  
Syria’s provocation of the 1967 war was not a result of refugee presence or direct 
pressure from the Palestinian refugees.  Political interactions and the struggle for 
dominance between Arab states and retaliation by Israel caused finger-pointing towards 
Egypt by the Syrian government.  “Ba’thist Syria, a narrowly based radical regime, was 
championing the Palestinian cause to win domestic legitimacy and outbid Nasser for Pan-
Arab leadership.”172  In an effort to protect his position Nasser ordered UN peacekeeping 
troops out of the Sinai Peninsula and postured for war. Thus, these two countries 
involved themselves in the 1967 War, not due to refugee pressures, but rather out of 
political and power rivalries and the issue of national sovereignty. 
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Prior to the 1967 war Syria maintained tight control over the activities of 
Palestinian worker’s groups and militant groups including Fatah and the Palestinian 
Liberation Front.  In preparation for the possibility of increased militant action against 
Israel, Syria loosened some control and actively supplied these groups along side the 
build-up of national forces.173  This action is one indication of the continued support that 
Syria showed for causes related to Palestinian situation, while still maintaining tight 
regulation over Palestinian activist groups.  Furthermore, the guerilla activity and attacks 
on Israel were launched primarily though Lebanon and Jordan, preventing retaliatory 
actions directed at Syria.  
Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syrian policy was to use the Palestinian cause 
as a means for legitimacy and unity.  Now, following the conflict the “resistance [was] 
less a source of inspiration for a demoralized Arab public then a security risk…directing 
their new found militancy as much against their Arab hosts as against Israel.”174  In 
response, Syria under President Asad, maintained a tight control over the various groups.  
After a frustrating defeat, demoralizing the Arab states’ power to defend their territory, 
“the Syrians thus formed their own Palestinian organization, Saiqa, following the Six-
Day War, and allowed it to attack Israeli border positions” in the Syrian occupied 
areas.175  This organization was sponsored by and closely monitored by the Ba’th regime 
in control of the country and when Asad came to power in 1970, it was placed “under 
control of the Syrian defense ministry.176 
Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 was not on behalf of the 
Palestinians.  In fact, Syria entered to counter the PLO and the coalition of radical 
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Muslims in favor of the Maronite Christians.  Though predominantly Muslim and in 
favor of regaining Israel for the Palestinians, Syria did not want a faction in control of 
Lebanon which it could not influence or control.177   
From these examples, it is clear that the security issues that Syria faced were not 
caused by the Palestinian refugees living and working in Syria.  The government 
effectively minimized internal tensions between the refugee and host populations through 
integration at the levels of housing, work, education and military service.  The conflicts, 
which Syria was drawn into, stemmed primarily from the issues of national sovereignty 
and regional hegemony.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has clearly shown the relationship between the effects of national 
policies concerning refugee integration and the degree of serious security issues related to 
the presence of refugees in the country.  Palestinian refugees in Syria have experienced 
far more consistent treatment from the government than in either Lebanon or Egypt.  
Starting in 1948, Syria opened its country and its resources in efforts to care for and assist 
the Palestinians.  Syria has stood by its commitment to Arab solidarity by almost 
completely integrating the Palestinian refugees into Syrian society and by constant 
support in the struggle against Israel.  This has resulted in the near complete absence of 
refugee-generated problems. 
Through passing laws to ensure that the treatment of Palestinian refugees is equal 
to that of Syrian nations, Syria has enabled many Palestinians to obtain education in 
collaboration with UNRWA, to secure adequate jobs, and in many cases to move out of 
refugee camps.  Syria’s policy of integration has been successful in removing the attitude 
of “outsider” towards the refugees.  By making all jobs and opportunities open to both 
nationals and Palestinian refugees, there are reduced tensions because the government 
does not regard refugees as a negative influence.  Furthermore, requiring Palestinian 
refugees to serve in the Syrian military also may have reduced tensions.  
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Through the lack of distinct restrictions or policies of isolation, Palestinians have 
not had a reason to organize against the state. Through integration of Palestinian 
refugees, the Syrian government has been able to successfully support the Palestinians 
living in their country, while precluding them as a cause for insecurity. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has demonstrated that there is a relationship between the policies that a 
host country employs when dealing with refugees and the security problems related to 
refugees that develop within that particular (host) country.  The cases studies reveal that 
policies creating isolation, poverty and discontent cause a greater number of security 
problems.  Furthermore, a country such as Syria, with policies that integrate the refugee 
population, has been more successful in minimizing tensions, discontent and security 
threats to both the host state and the inter-state region.  Lastly, as might be expected, a 
particularly small refugee population was less likely to be able to create security issues, 
due to the inability of a small group of refugees to effectively challenge the control and 
monitoring of refugee actions by the host state. 
For refugees, in particular the Palestinian refugees discussed here, maintaining a 
sense of their (Palestinian) cultural identity has been shown to be a major factor in their 
satisfaction and their long-term goal of repatriation.  The policies generated by Lebanon, 
Egypt and Syria have affected the perception of the Palestinian refugees’ separate 
national identity as being either a threatening “outsider” or a neutral presence.  Increased 
levels of integration appear to lead more towards the perception of refugees as a neutral 
presence, as opposed to policies tending to isolate and/or alienate refugees, which in turn, 
lead towards a perception threatening to host nationals.    Through comparing the case 
studies of Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria the effects of isolation and integration have shown 
the refugees’ responses to these perceptions and the varying security outcomes. 
One undeniable characteristic of the Palestinians is that, in general, as refugees 
they seek repatriation as a solution to their now protracted situation.  This attribute 
presents several challenges affecting the conditions they experience in whichever host 
country they currently reside.  First, one difficulty is that, particularly early on, 
significant attempts to improve their living situation can be seen as a move towards 
permanent resettlement, and in some cases has been rejected.  The resettlement of 
Palestinians to third countries through help by the UNHCR has also been discouraged for 
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fear that resettlement would dilute to prominence of the Palestinian issue.178  Also, their 
desire to maintain Palestinian identity has allowed host countries to avoid granting these 
refugees citizenship and the corresponding rights and privileges.   
Lebanon is clearly the most isolating of the three host countries presented here.  
The living situation which Palestinian refugees face is bleak, and Lebanon has done little 
if anything to improve these conditions.  The only period in which Palestinians thrived 
was under control of the PLO, and this tenure came at a huge expense to the sovereignty 
and security of Lebanon.  Movement to and from the refugee camps as well as 
internationally has often been restricted and almost always been monitored.  Lebanon 
restricts the refugees from nearly all work, and with the exception of UNRWA, provides 
very little in assistance to help the Palestinians resident in their country.  These factors, 
along with the solidarity the Palestinians find among themselves in the consolidated camp 
spaces, have made both the refugees to feel and the host nationals to view the Palestinian 
refugees as outsiders.   
The alienation felt by the Palestinian refugees has caused the refugees to react 
both towards Lebanon and towards Israel, whom they blame for forcing them into their 
current situations.  Retaliation by the refugees has come in the form of militarization of 
the refugee camps, cross-border attacks and development of their own “state within a 
state.”  Since the Palestinians were not incorporated into the functioning of society when 
able they attempted to support and influence favored sects, which in turn caused internal 
insecurity.  Lebanon’s severest isolation has led to the most national insecurity of the 
three countries studied. 
Next, Egypt’s alienating though not completely isolating policies have managed 
not to create overwhelming security problems.  In trying to reduce the number of 
Palestinian refugees in Egypt, the government accepted only self-reliant refugees, and 
forced the rest of the Palestinian refugees out of the country.  The refugees in Egypt were 
forced to be more integrated into society than their equivalents in Lebanon, due to the 
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lack of refugee camps.  Since the only Palestinians allowed to remain in Egypt required 
to show proof of financial security, at first this intermingling by Palestinians refugees 
among Egyptians might have been successful, had the government had allowed the 
refugees to work.  Without a means of income or assistance form the international 
community through UNRWA or the UNHCR, the Palestinian refugees in Egypt began to 
struggle.  Egypt’s policies were not consistent, and over the change from monarch to 
president and between presidents, the Palestinians experienced first prosperity and then a 
decline back into poverty.   
The reception and view of the Egyptian host population fluctuated with the events 
of the surrounding region and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.  Palestinians in Egypt 
have not precipitated major refugee related security issues.  Although more of a 
marginalized than a functional part of society, being such a small refugee population and 
having experienced a broad range of policies, the Palestinian refugees in Egypt did not 
have the size or the cohesion amongst themselves to pose a particular or overwhelming 
threat.  
Finally, Syria short of granting citizenship so as to appease the Palestinians, has 
accomplished far more of Palestinian refugees than either Lebanon or Egypt, with its 
policy of integrating refugees into Syrian society.  By consistently treating the 
Palestinians on a par with its citizens, Syria has largely been able to avoid the 
development of tensions and negative perceptions of the refugees.  Able to work and 
receive benefits like all other citizens in the country, the Palestinian refugees have tended 
more towards cohesion with their Syrian counterparts, due to common workplaces, 
similar military obligations, and shared economic and social experiences.   
Syria has not experienced any major security problems, either caused or 
influenced by the presence of the Palestinian refugees.  Because the Palestinians are fully 
incorporated into Syrian society, there is a non-threatening perception of the refugees.  In 
turn, the Palestinian refugees have not found cause to rebel against the society that that 
has supported them, or a government that has supported their goal of regaining the 
territory that they lost in 1948. 
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Each of the countries discussed here is party to at least one if not several of the 
international agreements regarding refugees, however the level of compliance and 
implementation varies widely.  The intent of international law is to best protect refugees 
who are outside of their home country and are otherwise without protection or 
representation at the national or international level.  The general provisions in the various 
agreements, including the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol 
on the Status of Refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 
1965 Casablanca Protocol, seek to provide adequate rights to housing, employment and 
welfare, in order to allow for a sufficient quality of life in the host country.   
As demonstrated in this thesis, the nearer the policy applied by a host government 
follows the provisions in agreements regarding refugees, the more integrated refugees 
become.  Increased integration and shared experiences between the refugee and host 
nationals tend to minimize internal and regional security issues.  Therefore, adherence to 
international agreements has more tangible benefits than simple recognition and 
reputation at the international level.  In reality, compliance offers security and protection 
for the host country as well as the refugee. 
The experiences of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria are 
similar in many regards to the situation refugees across the globe, as are the security 
problems surrounding them.  While it is true that the particulars of each situation will 
vary, this study has shown that there is a basic relationship between the way in which 
refugees are treated and the potential for peaceful coexistence, as opposed to violence or 
destabilization.  The potential to shape the impact of future refugee movements will 
depend on the ability of both the international community and individual host countries to 
address the needs of the refugees, through integrating policies to positively affect refugee 
living condition, employment opportunities and financial resources, while shaping the 
host community’s favorable perception of those refugees.  The more that host countries 
employ common/international policies which help to integrate refugees and promote 
investment in the host society, the more possible it will be for both the host state and the 
surrounding region to achieve and acceptable lever of stability and security.  
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